The Broken Clock: When and How Nations Secede by McCay Martinez, Éamonn
 Standard front page for projects, subject module projects and 
master theses 
Compulsory use for all Master projects and the Master thesis at ISG: 
 International Development Studies 
 Global Studies 
 Erasmus Mundus, Global Studies – A European Perspective 
 Public Administration 
 Social Science 
 EU studies 
 Public Administration, MPA 
Project title:  
The Broken Clock: When and How Nations Secede 
Project seminar 
 
Prepared by (Name(s) and study number): Kind of project: Module: 
Éamonn McCay Martinez 50583 Master Thesis K2 
Name of Supervisor:  
Dr. Angela Bourne 
Submission date:  
29/06/2015 
Number of keystrokes incl. spaces: 
189,281 
Permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces: 
144,000 – 192,000 
NB! 
If you exceed the permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces your project will be rejected 
by the supervisor and/or the external examiner until 1 week after the submission. 
Roskilde University 
Department of ISG 
Global Studies 
Master Thesis 
 
The Broken Clock: When and How Nations Secede 
 
A review of the validity of the claims for secession under the current laws and theories of secession 
using the cases of Scotland and the Basque Country. 
 
 
 
 
 
Author: Éamonn McCay Martinez 
Supervisor: Angela Bourne 
Abstract 
This thesis reviews the international laws and theories of secession to evaluate the current 
standing of legitimate secession to promote a morally progressive process of secession. The thesis 
uses the theories of Primary Right and Remedial Only Right Theories of secession as the foundation 
of the understanding of legitimate secession to gather arguments of secession based on morality, 
logic and reality. This understanding from the theories is then used to assess the stance of 
international laws as well as domestic and international institutional decisions on the process of 
secession. Concepts such as the ‘principle of territorial integrity’ and ‘minimal realism’ connect 
international and domestic institutional law with theories, and arguments that stem from Remedial 
Only Right Theories are found in practice as well. Through a social constructivist perspective, an 
embedded multiple-case study of Scotland and the Basque Country are used to highlight the current 
– or potential – practice of secession. Theories of moral cosmopolitanism and the understanding of 
the establishment of law are used to suggest a revision of the practice of law that promotes a moral 
progression for the process of secession. 
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“The great cause of revolutions is this, that while nations move onward, constitutions stand still.”  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Scottish referendum and the events in the Basque Country lead us to consider 
international practices of secession for various reasons. The interest of international institutions has 
been to keep the promise of peace and prosperity in international relations (Role of UN, 2010). Yet, 
war and violence tend to be a factor for secession to be brought to the international sphere. A 
process that promotes secession without the factor of violence is a process that should be 
investigated more thoroughly and pursued within international and domestic institutions.  
So far, unless given by special rights (Buchanan, 1997), secession has been granted by 
international law as a remedy of extreme violations of human rights or of past violations. In most 
other case, states have been given the role in establishing the rule of law. As will be argued below, 
this leads to an unfair balance and the expense of non-state actors (Requejo, 2012). This presents a 
gap in the promise of rights and opportunities for all people, since, under certain situations, they are 
not attended to. This leads us to consider, how would the process of secession work without war?  
The most recent cases of secession that have been brought to the international sphere, 
Crimea and Kosovo, have both involved violence and violations of human rights. Secession of the 
Baltic States also presented cases of past injustices that necessitated a remedy. The conflicts were 
given due process and judged under the court of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case 
of Kosovo and the opinion of the United Nations (U.N.) in the case of Crimea. In both instances, 
international institutions needed to intervene to mediate the violent conflict that was otherwise 
unsettled. However, in cases of disputes with no violence present no remedy or process for 
international institutions to implement, leaving the dispute in the hands of the state.  
The case of Scotland and the Basque Country present two such instances where a process 
towards independence is being attempted through, now, peaceful means, while being under the 
jurisdiction of their parent-states, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Spain. They are interesting cases 
because they are two recent cases in a similar geo-political situation, yet present different obstacles 
and different argument for their claim to secession. The process of secession without the use or 
presence of violence is interesting for the consideration of international relations as it would involve 
a process that promotes peace that could be incorporated into international law.   
The recent referendum of Scotland in the fall of 2014 has sparked debate in many pluri-
national states on the new possibilities of acquiring secession (Calzada, 2014). The possibility of a 
secession taking place in the context of a peaceful and democratic country by internal means is 
appealing to many of the regions attempting to claim independence. Many regions have attempted 
to establish a referendum but have been denied those actions on the grounds of unconstitutionality 
(Calvo, 2012) or invalid methods (UN General Assembly, 2014). The potential to secede under 
terms determined by the nation and parent-state present a new situation many regions within states 
will look to achieve. The circumstances in which Scotland achieved the referendum serves as a new 
model for international institutions to incorporate to promote more peaceful means of negotiating 
secession while granting more decision-making powers otherwise monopolized by states (Requejo, 
2012).  
The debate of independence in the Basque Country has been an important issue, especially 
in recent history. Since the dictatorship of Franco (1936-1975) and the creation of the nationalist 
violent group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (1959- ), there has always been a struggle for greater 
rights, privileges and self-determination within the Basque Country (Landa, 2013). Like many other 
cases of secession, violence and “dirty war” has been an issue in the conflict (Etxebeste, 2014). In 
the Basque Country, the political end of achieving independence has often been linked to the means 
of violence presented by ETA. This has lead to the sometimes unfair connection between 
independentists and terrorism and the argument “everything is ETA” (Pradilla, 2015). Today, the 
group has claimed unilateral ceasefire as of November 2011, which seems to be the definitive one, 
and is looking to take steps to completely disband (Landa, 2013). However the history of violence is 
still an issue to be resolved. The role of the state in setting the terms of the rule of law has given 
Basque politics little options and rights to negotiate a process of secession. In 2008, the Plan 
Ibarretxe was deemed unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court (Calvo, 2012). The 
events in the Basque Country provide a situation, unlike Scotland’s, where a nation does not have 
the same decision-making powers as the state, or given by the state. It shows a case in which a 
nation (or nations) are neglected of their political, social, and cultural rights (Requejo, 2012). It 
leads international institutions to consider changes to its laws to grant greater decision-making 
powers to non-state actors otherwise not given by the state.  
Objective of the thesis 
This thesis’ aim is to review the current standing of theories and international law of 
secession. The use of declarations, conventions and treaties from the U.N. will set the background 
as standards for valid secession. The examples of Kosovo and Crimea will help further the 
understanding of the international law of secession through the rulings and opinions of both cases to 
see what the stance of international law is on secession. Primary Right and Remedial Only Right 
Theories of secession will also be used to gather arguments for the validity of secession to see in 
which cases secession should occur. The cases of Scotland and the Basque Country will serve to 
show how the most recent cases of secession-related events, sans violence, stand in relation to 
international law. With the use of theories such as moral cosmopolitanism, the thesis will then aim 
to propose a revision of the international law of secession that provides a platform in which rights 
are recognized beyond those of states.  
1.1 Problem formulation 
 
How do the recent referendum of Scotland and the possibilities on the right to self-determination in 
the Basque Country challenge the current theories, and international and domestic laws of 
secession?  
Research Questions 
1. What do current international law and theories of secession say about the rights of Scotland 
and Basque country to secede? 
2. What are the new characteristics of law of secession and democracy in this context? 
a) What new characteristics promote a moral progress of the law of secession and 
democracy? 
3. What position does the new context place future secession movements in? 
1.2 Limitations 
 
This thesis chose to focus on two cases to analyze how current secession movements stand 
in relation to international law and if they offer any challenges. By choosing these two cases, the 
analysis is limited to several other aspects of other secession movements. For example, when 
discussing the issue of the role of nations within states, the case of Catalonia would have served as 
an important example since they are in a situation where they don’t have decision-making powers 
(as the Discussion (Ch. 7) argues to reconsider), and at the same time don’t present the caveat of 
violence and terrorism which would make them exempt from such rights (as is argued for in the 
Basque Country).  
More time and space would have allowed the thesis to be better researched that delved 
deeper into debates, included more cases, topics and knowledge of the matter at hand. This allowed 
an understanding and analysis of the topic limited to the time and space given. The allotted time 
allowed a limited understanding of the debates on ethics and justice in international relations and 
the space given here also limited the scope of the discussion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Philosophy of science 
 
Social Constructivism 
The theories, methods and analysis will have a social constructivist approach. This implies 
an acceptance of a set of scientific assumptions and philosophical premises on the part of the 
author. Along the continuum of radical to a moderate version of social constructivism, this thesis 
assumes a position closer to the moderate end. It is understood by the author as an important detail 
that facts within the social sciences, for example theories, laws, legislation, and an international 
morality, are created by the opinions and formulations of theorists, politicians, journalists, and 
people in general who influence politics. This is an assumption relevant to the field of the social 
sciences that requires a different set of rules to say, the natural sciences (Kukla, 2000).  
The ‘truth’ found as a result of this thesis is not discovered as an objective truth, but 
constructed through the understanding of the laws and theories with influence of the background of 
the author. It is constructed in the Wittgensteinian sense that what is understood by terms and 
concept affected by what the author reads and understands of it. This understanding, affected by the 
background of the author, leads to a construction of the material at present (Kukla, 2000). The 
concepts, theories, and laws presented in this thesis are thus not to be taken as objectively true 
existing outside of human interaction, but are understood as categorizations created by people 
(Hacking, 1999). 
By using this methodology for the analysis, it is shown how the relations among the 
different laws and theories are themselves constructions of what that legislation or theory considers 
right with regards to the international law of secession, and how recent movements (i.e. Scotland) 
and debates (i.e. Basque Country) further influence the sense of what is legitimate secession. Thus, 
research in this thesis requires an awareness and caution of the different opinions and positions, as 
well as those of the author. A social constructivist paradigm will acknowledge and allow the 
analysis to be conscious of relevant background. Through this perspective, this approach aims to 
analyze the social resultant of interactions between different perspectives and different wills.  
2.2 Choice of Data 
 
 The analysis of the laws, theories and current statuses of the respective regions will be 
conducted through secondary data gathered from debates, recent articles, policies, national 
constitutions, international declarations, conventions, and theories of secession (Buchanan, 1997). 
The data is not exhaustive of what exists, but is sufficient for the purpose of identifying the status of 
laws, theories and political realities and making note of the discrepancies between the three as is 
intended by the problem formulation.  
The secondary data is gathered from the documents, policies, laws and official statements of 
relevant parties, governments and international institutions. This means that the positions from 
which the data are constructed, is key for the research conducted through such an approach as the 
one done with a social constructivist lens. The contradictions or differences between the data are the 
central focus of the thesis which aims to highlight where the differences of a cultural, political, and 
ideological stance lie and suggest where and whether they should change. 
Specific data sources will be made note of the first time they are mentioned. This will serve 
the purpose of bringing awareness of the agenda’s of parties, nations and countries that may be 
present within each publication or article. Such awareness of the sources will ensure and remind the 
reader of the nature of the thesis that requires a constructivist approach. A large part of the data 
from the Basque case is originally in Spanish for which the author has relied on self-made 
translations. 
2.3 Case Design 
 
This thesis aims to highlight the relation between theory, law and praxis of secession. It will 
achieve this by using current laws, standards, and theories of secession, and compare it to current 
events of secession. The thesis will examine the relation between legislation, theory, and praxis, and 
make note of discrepancies between the two to suggest where either legislation and theory, or 
political reality should change for a more progressive political morality. In order to achieve this, a 
case study has been chosen as the preferred method of research. According to Robert Yin (2013), a 
case study is appropriate to use when, “1) the main research questions are ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions; 
2) a researcher has little or no control over behavioral events; and 3) the focus of study is a 
contemporary (as opposed to entirely historical) phenomenon,” all three of which are fulfilled by 
the presented thesis. Furthermore, a case study is relevant to use when there is a need to understand 
complex social phenomena (Yin, 2013). 
Yin’s (2013) categorization of case studies provides a useful way to divide case studies into 
“four basic types.” For the thesis, an embedded multiple-case study was chosen. Multiple-case is 
chosen as the analysis presents two cases for the topic of secession, Scotland and the Basque 
Country. It is an embedded study as there are multiple units of analysis including the state, 
international law, and theories of secession. The three units will be used across each of the two 
cases in order to reinforce the explanatory power of the highlighted factors.  
As Tarrow (2010) has noted, a two-case study, as opposed to a single case study, has the 
advantage of reinforcing the causality of the chosen factor on the final outcome. Any more than two 
cases however will diminish its inferential power as the number of unmeasured variables will 
increase. Thus, to keep control of the factors being measured, only two cases have been chosen. As 
both cases are in European contexts and in similar situations, the comparative power of the two 
presented cases will be quite strong. 
2.4 Choice of Cases   
 
The Scottish and Basque cases serve to show examples of, 1) a region with greater powers 
resulting in a successful referendum, and 2) a region with fewer powers with a history of violent 
conflict paired with the issue of terrorism, respectively. The debates, legal actions, and laws 
surrounding each of the two cases will highlight the current standing of law and theory with regards 
to secession, internationally and domestically in both the U.K. and in Spain, and how they 
differentiate between theory, law and praxis. 
Scotland is a relevant choice since it is an example of the most recent and successful 
examples of allowing a referendum to occur under mutual consent. By successful it is meant that a 
referendum was able to take place legally, without the presence of violence, and with less 
controversy than usual from the international community. For many secession seeking regions, a 
best case scenario. Such an example of a successful referendum taking place offers important 
discussion points on the progression of secession and what is considered legitimate. Thereafter, a 
comparison between Scotland and the Basque Country will show the differences in factors of each 
case of secession. The differences in factors will help understand where they both stand in relation 
to theory and laws of secession, offer different perspectives to the right to secede, and, overall, 
assess the legitimacy of secession as it stands today.  
The case of the Basque Country is interesting as it has many factors present that offer a 
different view into the debates and progression of the international law of secession. The presence 
of violence in the case (from both Spain and the Basque Country) presents interesting questions for 
the right to secede if it were to reach the case of the international courts. The issues of terrorism, 
violence, and political prisoners are issues that offer many important discussion points relevant to 
recent rulings of declarations of independence. Conflict resolution and the peace process add more 
dimensions and depth to the debate of secession and offer new situations for international law to 
consider. Part of resolving a territorial issue, or independence in this case, involves the resolution of 
violence where there is one so that both parties can make amends and a promise for peace in the 
future, such as in Northern Ireland (Rowley, 2015). Ultimately, such an analysis will show the 
complexity answers to secession can be that goes beyond many standards and rules created by 
theories and legislation.  
 Figure 1: Map of the Greater Basque Region (Cassel & Dehez, 2014) 
Still, the two cases are similar enough to account for the effect of variables, yet present 
different situations which will give an important overview to the discussion of secession. The 
boundaries of the “Greater Basque Country” are less established than for the country of Scotland, 
depending on who is asked. To facilitate the process of analyzing a “Basque” and “Scottish” case, 
the analysis will include any instance of secessionist movement relevant to the Basque case 
encompassing the Greater Basque Country (see figure 1); the Autonomous Community of the 
Basque Country and the Chartered Community of Navarre belonging to Spain, and three provinces 
in the Pyrénées-Atlantiques department belonging to France; Lower Navarre, Labourd, and Soule. 
For simplicities sake, the analysis will focus on law and legislation in Spain, although information 
and other movements occurring in France will also be included where relevant. 
Table 1: Characteristics of cases 
Scotland Basque Country 
Similarities  
5,327,700
 
 
3,064,875 (greater Basque region)   
GDP per capita: 45,045 USD dollars
1
 GDP per capita: 33,318 USD
2
 (average 
between ACBC
3
 & Navarre) 
Devolved Scottish government Devolved Basque Government 
Scottish distinctiveness Basque distinctiveness 
Under UK constitution Under the Spanish Constitution 
                                                             
1 Quarterly National Accounts Scotland (2015) 
2 Basque Country (2015) and Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2013) 
3 Autonomous Community of the Basque Country 
Differences  
Unified nationalist party - SNP Divided nationalist parties and interests 
No violent organized group, past or present Long history of violence until recently by 
terrorist group ETA 
 
Similarities (control variables) 
Both the Basque Country and Scotland hold high GDP per capita values in comparison to 
the regions or countries of the parent state
1
. The recent economic advantage relative to their 
neighbours gives them incentive to secede and control their fiscal activities (Lavanguardia, 2015). 
Both have advanced economies with a strong industrial sector (Basque Country) or opportunities to 
acquire a strong economic sector (North Sea Oil in Scotland). Similarly to Catalonia, the greater 
economy of the regions is sometimes used as an argument for secession as they feel the parent state 
is mishandling their resources, or proposing that they would be better off without Spain 
(Lavanguardia, 2015; Scottish Government, 2013). Likewise, seen from the other perspective, Spain 
and the U.K. have reason to ensure they stay a part of the state as they are important contributors of 
the economies of their respective states.  
This relates to the requirement seen in Remedial Right Theories of secession in which a 
region or nation that wishes to secede must also be able to prove the maintenance of similar or 
better rights than those provided by the parent-state (Buchanan, 2007). As Horowitz (2003) 
explains, the group in question needs to show the capacity to provide justice, basic human rights, 
and economic opportunities as afforded to them under the previous state. This requirement must be 
fulfilled for the group to be granted the right to secede, and although many debates and analyses 
argue for and against the economic capabilities of the regions (Lavanguardia, 2015; Scottish 
Government, 2013), the regions do not present alarming instances of not being able to survive 
(O’Brien, 2014). 
The Basque Country and Scotland are also home to a proud, ethnic and cultural population 
with a long history of territorial conflict by a kingdom or state. The cultural, lingual, political, 
historical, social, and economical differences are seen as a reason for the region and country to 
establish their own state. The population is also within a well-established or at least a recognizable 
boundary within a specific territory, as opposed to Romani people, for example.  
This relates to the Ascriptive Group Theory as part of the Primary Right Theories of 
secession (Buchanan, 1997). As the theory section below will explain, Ascriptive Group theories 
postulate that for a region, nation or people to be granted the right to secede, they need to form a 
group that is unified by ascriptive characteristics which are language, history, ethnicity, or culture. 
This shows that they are a ‘people’ as per definition of Ascriptive Group Theory. By simple fact of 
their characteristic homogeneity, they are thus afforded the right to form their own political unit. 
                                                             
 
The country and region are also in similar situations accorded to them by the constitutions of 
their respective states. Though they form part of the parent state and are obliged to their laws, they 
also enjoy a great degree of autonomy. Both maintain a form of self-government under a unitary 
state and have similar legal statuses under the legislations of their parent state. They have their own 
president, elected by the population within the region and elect candidates to represent them in their 
own local and regional institutions. They have similarly been in a process of devolution in their 
recent history (Bizkaiatalent, 2015; Scotland Act, 1998). 
 Furthermore, the U.K. and Spain hold interests in keeping the regions despite the efforts of 
independentist parties, in which parties demanding more independence overlap with left-leaning 
policies (e.g. Euskal Herria Bildu). Both are also part of states in which they do not suffer from 
flagrant human rights violations in the sense in which the international law of secession grants 
secession as a remedy of human rights violations. They belong to democratic states and maintain 
European Union (EU) membership in which the regions have options to belong to an already 
established network for their economic and political aspirations. The differences of outcome to their 
attempts of secession should thus be attributed to other aspects of their situations.  
Pointing out the similarities between the two regions will help identify the reason for why 
they have different outcomes to their attempts of independence. Under this section, Scotland and the 
Basque Country are identified as being similar in their capabilities as providers of rights and 
opportunities for their citizens, consisting of a homogenized group, and having similar legislative 
powers. All of which relate to Scotland and the Basque Country’s similarities of their right to 
secede under the theories of territorial integrity, Ascriptive Group theories, and Remedial Right 
Only theories.  
Differences 
On the other hand, they are also in unique political situations that make each case different 
from the other. In discourse, the U.K. and Spanish governments view the regions’ secession in 
different perspectives. The British Prime Minister David Cameron’s quote stands in contrast to what 
the Spanish government say about either the Basque or Catalan regions which considers a unilateral 
referendum as illegal: “This United Kingdom can never hold a country within it without its 
consent” (Chu, 2012). As a consequence, a unilateral referendum of Scotland was legal and allowed 
in the fall of 2014. Political authorities in Spain have called both referendums of the Basques and 
Catalans, as illegal and unconstitutional, since the Constitution holds that a referendum must be 
authorized by “popular consultation,” voted on by the Spanish people and must be called on by the 
central government and the king (Art. 149(1), Art. 92, Art. 62 C.E.). Furthermore, Basques and 
Catalans are not recognized in the Constitution as nations, making it illegal for a referendum to be 
authorized unilaterally by any one region (Calzada, 2014).  
The U.K. on the other hand does not have a single constitutional document, sometimes 
expressed as an “unwritten” constitution (Barnett, 2005). Instead, the laws that make up the 
constitution of the U.K. are made up of international treaties, agreements, as well as historic English 
laws. Today, bills passed by the parliament are what make up the laws and thus the “uncodified 
constitution” (aboutbritain, 2015). The parliament is made up of three bodies, the House of 
Commons, House of Lords, and the Monarch, in which bills must be approved by the House of 
Commons and House of Lords until it is passed to the Monarch and signed into law. It is in the 
House of Commons where most bills are brought up and debated (aboutbritain, 2015). House of 
Commons Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected in national elections in which the Scottish 
National Party represent 56 of the 650 seats. Furthermore, the Scottish Parliament have the right to 
create laws that are not reserved for the British Parliament, and the British Parliament can 
furthermore change the terms of the Scottish Parliament’s law-making abilities (Murkens, Jones, & 
Keating, 2002).  
In theory, if Scotland’s referendum led to a complete political separation between the U.K. 
and Scotland, this mode of secession would fall under the internal right to self-determination where 
a region internally decides their political status (Seymour, 2007). Of course since an agreement was 
made with the U.K. government this also falls under the category of a special right as the region and 
parent-state mutually agrees to a separation of political powers (Buchanan, 1997). As it will be 
elaborated upon further below, this right to secede comes from the first instance of special rights as 
explained by Buchanan (1997) where “the state grants the right to secede” (pp. 34).  
In the case of the Basque Country, since the laws in Spain consider it illegal for an internal 
right to self-determination, Basques would have a just cause for the Basque Country to claim rights 
to secession, under the theory of the internal right to self-determination (Seymour, 2007). In legal 
terms however, an internal right to self-determination is illegitimate according to the articles of the 
Spanish constitution. As states are the primary providers of law, especially in domestic politics, the 
concept of territorial integrity suggests that first and foremost the laws within states must be 
respected and upheld (Horowitz, 2003).  
This difference in domestic politics affords each region very different opportunities in their 
attempts to become independent. It is an important difference as a region’s right to self-
determination must first and foremost be approved by the parent-state and be respected and upheld 
where no human rights violations are committed. Though Scotland’s referendum was cleared, the 
case of the Basque Country are presented with obstacles in their decision-making powers in relation 
to Spain. An important difference highlighted here in Scotland and the Basque Country’s attempt at 
secession lies within the domestic politics, where the referendum was allowed in one case and not 
in the other. Because of this difference, it asks questions of the rule of law and the rights of states in 
establishing those laws (Calzada, 2014; Requejo, 2012).  
Party-politics within Scotland and the Basque Country also give them different contexts in 
which they address secession. In Scotland, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) is a majority party 
that has largely unified Scotland politically. In the last British elections, results showed a significant 
polarization of the people between Scotland and the rest of the U.K., where 54 of the 59 seats of the 
Scottish Parliament were given to SNP Members of Parliament (MP) (Telegraph(a), 2015). In the 
Basque Country on the other hand, political interests among Basque citizens is quite varied. Partido 
Nacional Vasco (PNV) has at times proposed secession from Spain, such as with the Plan 
Ibarretxe, but at other times accepted the path towards autonomy (Letona, 2014). On the other 
hand, Bildu (“Unite” in Basque) has formed a conglomerate of past illegalized left-nationalist 
parties and pushed for greater sovereignty than the PNV has traditionally demanded. Divided 
constituencies within the Greater Basque Country further complicates matters as there exist 
different parties is Navarra, where the Union del Pueblo Navarro (UPN) has held the majority since 
the existence of a democratic Spain. No party in the whole of the Basque Country appears to be an 
overwhelming majority, and the issue of the French Basque Country complicates matters even 
further as it belongs to a different political unit – France – and thus has different parties to represent 
them. 
The difference in party politics is also a big factor for assessing the legitimacy of secession 
as per the relevant theory. As “Plebiscite theory explains …, the group in question should be in 
uniformity as to their political decision” (Buchanan, 1997). Not only is this in accordance with 
theory but it is also logical. If a decision to achieve a new status cannot reach consensus, then no 
change should be made. Scotland rejected the status change in their recent independence 
referendum; however appear to agree on a party to represent them, which ironically is a party that 
promotes independence. Scotland therefore meets the requirement of plebiscite theory that falls 
under Associative Group theories where a region associates themselves, at least by a majority, 
under a singular party (Buchanan, 1997). The Basque Country on the other hand fails to gather a 
political unit that is in agreement either in party selection or in opinion of their status 
(Euskobarómetro, 2014).  
They also have different situations in relation to their recent history with the parent state. 
While Scotland maintains peaceful relations with the U.K., the Basque Country has a recent history 
of violence with the Spanish government, ETA fighting for the Basque cause, and GAL and other 
aggression from State officials on the Spanish side (Landa, 2013; Etxebeste, 2014). This make the 
Basque case more complicated than the Scottish one since the issue of violence and terrorism is an 
issue yet to be resolved between state and region. The illegalization and illegitimacy of a lot of 
political activity of Basque independentist politics, the imprisonment and dispersion of 
independendist actors, and other more general human rights violations and the process of making 
amends with the victims of violence, on both side, are obstacles. These are issues that are relevant 
in the debate for secession that does not exist in the Scottish case. 
These issues of violence relate to theories of Remedial Only Right theories where human 
rights are concerned. Many of the Spanish government and national police’s methods of dealing 
with terrorism have been questioned and even brought in front of international court’s (CETIM, 
2013; Naiz, 2010). The violation of human rights against Basques political prisoners however may 
not be relevant to the types and degree spoken of in theories of Remedial Only Right theories of 
secession. One, there are hundreds of cases political prisoners for their alleged involvement with 
ETA (Ibid.). It is not a case of thousands or even millions that are being systematically neglected of 
their political will or basic human rights like in the case of Kosovo. Two, violence from the Spanish 
state is not put on equal footing as ETA’s actions since violence from the state is more easily 
justified (Fitzgerald, 2012), thus harder to report. Although they relate to Remedial Only Right 
Theories, the connection to categorize them under the same standards as other examples of 
Remedial Only Right Theories is difficult.  
Still the presence of terrorism in Basque politics complicates the matter of human right 
violations against them and how international institutions treat such allegations. This presents an 
obstacle for the Basque Country in their attempt of achieving secession as terrorism and terrorist 
groups have been the focal point of human rights violations in recent history (UNSC Resolution 
1535). As a result, the Basque case receives a greater challenge to achieve independence in 
comparison to Scotland for their history and involvement of violence and terrorism in the political 
realm. 
The outcomes for each of the cases of Scotland and the Basque Country are therefore 
attributed to the political and situational differences between them. These are, the presence of 
terrorism and violence, levels of power and general relationship to the parent-state, and a political 
and opinionated unification of citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Theory 
 
This section will spell-out the characteristics of the theories introduced above. A big part of 
this thesis is to establish a coherent understanding of what theories say about secession. This 
understanding of the theory will be used in the analysis to assess the extent to which the theories 
match with current laws and current movements of secession. Therefore it is important – as well as 
being the aim of this section – to present a thorough and coherent understanding of what the 
theories say about secession in order to analyze in which instances secession in the Basque Country 
and Scotland are theoretically legitimate.  
The theories will be presented through Buchanan’s (1997) review of theories in Theories of 
Secession. One of his main contentions that will serve purposeful for this thesis is that, “unless 
institutional considerations are taken into account … in developing a normative theory of secession, 
the result is unlikely to be of much value for the task of providing moral guidance for institutional 
reform” (Buchanan, 1997; 33) This is an important detail for the thesis as the aim of the thesis is to 
suggest a morally guided revision of laws and theories of secession. In order to present such a 
revision, the theories will also be closely linked to the most relevant and recent international laws. 
Just as there are many opinions of secession, there are many theories which differ on the 
contexts in which a group or nation have the right to secede. This thesis will deal with a number of 
normative theories for the justification for the right to secede. To show the relation between theory 
and law, there will be a focus of theories that are more consistent with the laws of secession and 
link them wherever they make the same claims. To achieve this, this section will present the main 
theories of secession that are most correlated to the laws. Thereafter, a set of alternative theories 
will be presented to facilitate the discussion of the revision of laws and theories of secession this 
thesis aims to propose. 
Because “secession crises tend to have international consequences,” (Buchanan, 1997; 33) 
the international institutional aspect is one that will be mentioned regularly. Consequently, 
international law is seen as an important aspect of this thesis. Hence, one of the normative questions 
proposed by Buchanan (1997) will be used as a guide in review of the theories of secession: “Under 
what conditions should a group be recognized as having a right to secede as a matter of 
international institutional morality, including a morally defensible system of international law?” 
(Buchanan, 1997: 32). The review of the theories will be discussed with answers to this question in 
mind. 
3.1 Remedial Right Only Theories 
 
 In law, rights to secede are granted mostly under the terms that they serve as a remedy to an 
unresolved issue. Remedial Right Only Theories maintain “that a group has a general right to 
secede if and only if it has suffered certain injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy 
of the last resort” (Buchanan, 1997; 34-35). This definition for the Remedial Right Only Theories 
stems from an understanding of John Locke’s normative theory of revolution that grants people the 
right to overthrow a government if their rights have been violated and no other peaceful means are 
available. The difference between the right to revolution and the right to secede comes to the role of 
citizenship where the aim of the right to secede is not to overthrow the government but to break the 
government’s control over that territory (Buchanan, 1997). The case in which the right to secede is 
legitimate and may be granted may be seen as similar to Locke’s postulation of the theory of 
revolution, that when people suffer enough injustices, they will mobilize against the suppressors. 
When these injustices are perpetrated against a particular group within a state, then secession is 
considered legitimate and justified. 
The key to the differences between theories of Remedial Right Only Theories is the 
identification of different injustices and what they consider as an injustice. According to Buchanan 
(1997), the right to secede under Remedial Right Only Theories may be granted when: “1) the 
physical survival of its members is threatened by actions of the state or it suffers violations of other 
basic human rights, or 2) Its previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken by the state” 
(Buchanan, 1997;37). On top of these conditions, the new state must also be able to secure human 
rights for all and create other just terms of secession, in order for the group to be granted the right to 
secede (Horowitz, 2003).  
 There also exist a series of ‘special rights’ that come under the Remedial Right Only 
Theories. This ‘special right’ is named so as it concerns special cases, however the general right is 
limited to cases where the group in question has suffered injustices. These special rights may be 
granted if “1) the state grants a right to secede, 2) the constitution of the state includes a right to 
secede, or 3) the agreement by which the state was initially created out of previously independent 
political units included the implicit or explicit assumption that secession at a later point was 
permissible” (Buchanan, 1997;36). If any of these three conditions are met, then the right to secede 
is granted under a special classification but may not be given a general right to secede. 
3.2 Primary Right Theories 
 
 Primary Right Theories of secession, according to Buchanan (1997), can be classified under 
two groups: Ascriptive Group Theories and Associative Group Theories. Primary Right Theories 
maintain that groups have a right to secede in the absence of injustices. Ascriptive Group Theories 
include the Nationalist Principle whereby a nation or people are permitted its own state. Associative 
Group Theories explain that when a group can collect a majority in favor of independence, they 
have the right to secede. 
 Ascriptive Group Theories concern common characteristics that group people together 
which give them the right to secede. The following characteristics, and the combination of them, 
will be used for the purpose of identifying a definition of “peoples” as it is used in theories, laws 
and court rulings. They are: a common language, culture, history, and a sense of distinction 
(Buchanan, 1997). These characteristics form the understanding of a “people” or “peoples” as 
explained in the theories and laws of secession. As per the terms of Ascriptive Group Theories, no 
political organization or desire to form such an organization is required for the group to have the 
right to secede (Buchanan, 1997). Margalit and Raz (1990) explain the Nationalist Principle of 
groups whose members mutually recognize themselves as part of the group, who have a common 
culture and character that is treated as a matter of belonging and not of achievement. In other words, 
the mutual recognition of a group by the characteristics mentioned above without the accordance of 
a political status, are grounds for secession. The fact that the group is a people or a nation does not 
imply that they have suffered injustices but have the right to secede for that fact alone. 
Associative Group Theories on the other hand do not require the group in question to hold 
any ascriptive characteristics as the ones mentioned above but to hold a voluntary political choice. 
This means that despite not having any common cultural, ethnic or other characteristics, or even 
believing in having any common characteristics, the group merely needs to be in agreement that 
they would like to form an independent political unit (Buchanan, 1997). The basic definition for this 
theory of secession is that “members of the group voluntarily choose to associate together in an 
independent political unit of their own” (Buchanan, 1997; 39). The right to secede is thus granted 
by the right of political association. Beran (1987) adds to the plebiscite theory by postulating that 
any group may secede if they fulfill the following two requirements: If “1) it constitutes a 
substantial majority in its portion of the state, wishes to secede, and 2) will be able to marshal the 
resources necessary for a viable independent state” (Beran, 1987; 42). The rights are given as a 
primary right, as opposed to remedial, as the right is not given as a consequence of a violation of 
one type or another. The right is given by an independent characterization of their will to form a 
state.  
Primary Right theories of secession are not well supported by many theorists with 
international law in mind. Theorists such as Buchanan (1997) explain that Primary Right theories of 
secession fail the test of ‘minimal realism’ in which a law or theory will be supported by 
international institutions. Coming from the assumption that laws in international institutions are 
constructed by states in self-interest, it is unlikely that laws which facilitate the dismemberment of 
their states will be supported. Thus the requirements postulated by Primary Right theories will not 
gain much support in the international sphere and will not be considered legitimate modes of 
secession. Furthermore, Horowitz (2003) explains that such theories of secession cannot be 
supported in the international community because it will promote secession too easily to the point 
where there will be international chaos. This stands in line with Buchanan’s (1997) explanation of 
Primary Right theories of secession in which a seceded region will also have to promote policies of 
secession similar to theirs. 
 As was explained in the previous section, Primary Right Theories will not be supported to 
the extent of Remedial Only Right Theories by the international community (Buchanan, 1997; 
Horowitz, 2003). Articles from the UN’s declarations and conventions on legitimate secession 
mention the concept of a “people,” however those are not seen as grounds for secession in and of 
themselves. On the other hand, referendum results were acknowledged and seen as a legitimate 
reason of Kosovo’s declaration of independence by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (ICJ 
Reports, 2010). The importance laid on Ascriptive Group Theories is thus minimal, however 
Associative Group Theories, in a fair and legitimate referendum, have an effect on the ruling of 
declarations of independence. 
As a response to the literature provided by Buchanan, Seymour’s (2007) article criticizes the 
current conditions of secession as too conservative and adds a further condition to the literature; the 
general internal right to self-determination. As explained by Seymour (2007), the general internal 
right to self-determination entails a primary right to internal self-determination. This means that a 
people have the ability to develop and determine their own political status within their parent state. 
Similar to the Remedial Right Only Theories of secession, violation of the right to internal self-
determination is also seen as just cause for seceding (Seymour, 2007).  
Furthermore, “a nation is entitled to unilateral secession when confronted to the state's 
persisting violation of agreements to accord a minority group limited self-government within the 
state” (Seymour, 2007). In other words, a systematic violation of a previous agreement of the right 
to self-government of a region or peoples is grounds for secession. 
Expectations of what the theories may lead the analysis to 
The theories presented here will lead the analysis to an understanding of international law. 
This understanding will help shed light on the reasons and logic behind the statements, opinions, 
and decisions of international institutions on issues of secession. Theories discuss the morality, 
logic and practical use of methods of secession in order to assess which methods promote human 
rights, peace, morality, or the most realistic scenario of international relations. As has been 
mentioned, there is an overlap between Remedial Right Theories and international laws of secession 
(Buchanan, 1997), so the analysis is expected to show a situation in which secession is granted as a 
remedy rather than a primary right. In the discussion, the thesis will aim to propose a right to secede 
not granted by remedy in order to avoid a conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. International Law of secession  
 
 As it is in line with Article Eight of the Montevideo Convention, international law must, 
first and foremost, respect the laws of states (Art. 8, Montevideo Convention, 1933). It will only 
intervene in the case of violations of human rights or in a conflict of internal matters that needs 
resolution by an intermediary (Roethke, 2006). Still, international law cannot grant the right to 
secede nor does it prohibit secession (Franck, 2000; Tanner & Stevenson, 2010). However, in the 
cases of human rights violations, international law allows a region or peoples to secede along with a 
number of other requirements depending on the context. This is in accordance with Remedial Only 
Right theories which explain violence or violations as a valid reason for secession.  
To find a coherent understanding of secession from international law, articles from various 
treaties and declarations will be used and put together where there is an overlap. Specifically, the 
UN’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966), and the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations (DPILCFR) will be presented and used for the analysis.  
Although neither Scotland nor the Basque Country are colonized countries, the articles 
present terms that are used in rulings of independence in many cases where colonization is not an 
issue (e.g. Kosovo and Crimea). In addition, these articles are meant to be legally binding as states 
are encouraged to recognize court decisions, thus establishing the importance of international law’s 
understanding of legitimate reasons for secession. In effect the recognition of the decisions often 
times leads to the official establishment of a state’s or region’s status, as the examples of Kosovo 
and Crimea will show. 
In addition to the articles of the declarations and treaties of the U.N., to add more relevance 
to the laws, the stance of international law will also be concocted through recent rulings and 
positions of international organizations in relation to secession disputes. The ICJ’s rulings on 
Kosovo and Crimea’s unilateral declarations of independence will be used to gather the most 
coherent understanding of when a nation can and cannot become independent through the judgment 
of international law. International law refers to the articles of the treaties and declarations in their 
decisions, so there will be an overlap between the articles and the court’s rulings. However rulings 
also take the issues of context into consideration, which will help understand the nuances of 
legitimate secession. This will show the importance of international law and how rulings from 
international institutions have affected domestic politics.  
The Role and Sources of International Law 
The relationship between international law or institutions, and states can be quite nuanced 
and are sometimes mixed. On the one hand there is the idea that international law establishes 
cooperation and laws for states to comply to (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005), and on the other, the idea 
that states use international law as a platform to provide for their interests and only participate when 
it is useful (Sohn, 1995; Goldsmith & Posner, 2005). This relationship reveals many of the 
intricacies of the role of international law and the sources of it. Though they may seem like (and can 
be) contradicting concepts, this section will show the feed-back loop present between law and 
politics with both influencing the other constantly (Reus-Smit, 2004). 
Ideally, the role of international law is to promote world peace and prosperity. International 
institutions, such as the United Nations (U.N.) have been created to resolve issues between, and 
sometimes, within states (Schwabach & Cockfield, 2002). The U.N.’s role in the international 
sphere is to uphold laws and provide court decisions to regulate international relations (Role of UN, 
2010). The law and the institutions which govern the international society however use laws which 
come from a source. In turn, this source influences the ideology behind the laws they use. This 
source, or sources, is many times influenced by states, leading to the “feed-back” as Reus-Smit 
(2004) calls it. This “feed-back” is essentially the effect whereby the laws created by states are 
adopted by international law, and in turn, those laws are fed-back as international institutions use 
them to govern the actions of states.  
The international legal system itself does not have the jurisdiction to change matters within 
states, nor do any other states (Sohn, 1995). As the Montevideo Convention and other UN treaties 
explain, the territorial integrity of states is a right and must be respected by other states (Art. 8, 
Montevideo Convention, 1933; DPILCFR, 1970). Only in the case of violations of international law 
(including human rights), are states subject to international intervention and international court 
decisions. Consequently, these decisions are suggested to be complied with by international 
institutions. As the examples of Kosovo and Crimea show, international courts and decisions do 
influence behavior and status changes between and within states. As it is intended by the U.N., 
international institutions are thus used to uphold laws and enforce the rule of law in international 
relations (Schwabach & Cockfield, 2002; Role of UN, 2010). 
International law and institutions also have the role of setting the framework for how 
international relations are conducted. As Reus-Smit (2004) explains, the language states use to 
argue the legitimacy of their position is loaded with legal terms and constantly refer to articles from 
declarations and treaties constructed by international institutions. The international legal system 
provides a vocabulary and guidance for diplomacy and it is within this “relationship between the 
language of law and the practice of politics” (Borgen, 2009; 1) the thesis will explore the 
international law of secession. For example, in the case of the Iraqi invasion by U.S., though it was 
a deeply political issue, arguments for the legitimacy of international intervention consisted of legal 
terms at every discussion of the invasion at the UN Security Council (Reus-Smit, 1995). The 
examples and cases used herein will also show the extent to which the legitimacy of a political 
action is argued with legal terms. International institutions thus have an important role in 
maintaining the behavior of states in the international society. However as was suggested above, the 
relationship is not a one-sided affair. Upon deeper inspection, one can see that many of the laws 
from international court rulings and declarations also have a state-influenced source (Sohn, 1995). 
Sohn (1995) explains, that international “law is made by the practice of states, i.e. by their 
Foreign Offices and by decisions of courts, domestic and international” (pg. 401). Previously 
legitimized actions of states set precedents for future actions to be considered legal. For example 
Russia argued the legality of Crimean secession on the grounds that a few years earlier Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence was considered legal. Reus-Smit (2004), among others, 
reiterates this influence states have in international law creation. In his book The politics of 
international law, Reus-Smit explains how politics influence international law and how this law 
then “feeds back” to establish international relations and politics (Reus-Smit, 2004; 1).  
To explain the source of international law by way of states is to acknowledge their role in 
establishing it. Before the establishment of today’s international institutions, treaties among states 
were used to create terms that states conformed to (Sohn, 1995). It was the first trade treaties among 
countries that began to build an agreed upon system around the world. With countries making 
treaties and agreeing to similar terms, those terms would soon proliferate between countries far and 
wide until they all had more or less the same principles (Sohn, 1995). By agreeing to the same rules, 
an international consensus was met and created a law in an international scale. Soon after, 
declarations and conventions would be created by international institutions that obliged states 
around the world to abide by, thus completing the feed-back loop (Reus-Smit, 2004).  
Today’s version of international law reflects the liberalism of “Western” values. These 
values have been noted as being “the rule of law, capitalism, democracy, and an emphasis on 
human rights” (Schwabach & Cockfield, 2002; 1), thus favoring the politics of western states and 
showing their role in the establishment of today’s law in international relations. Still, the 
international legal system is important in regulating state affairs, as do the behaviors of states also 
influence international law as they set precedents for later rulings and establish an overall 
understanding of international law by consensus among states united under the UN. 
The view of the creation of international law by state consensus however has its criticisms. 
When considering human rights, the consensus between states is seen as self-interested and not in 
those of individuals (Tesón, 1998). In the book Philosophy of International Law, Tesón (1998) 
explains his version of the function of international law based on – with a revision – the philosophy 
of Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, the laws and rights given by sovereign states to individuals 
and international peace are two interconnected concepts in which the former must exist for the latter 
to work (Tesón, 1998). International law must have normative values and those normative values 
must come from a respect for human rights. He (Ibid.) believes that for an institution, state, or 
organization to rule over human beings, it must respect and offer a progression of human rights. A 
law created out of state consensus, however cannot achieve that since they established a law 
through the interest of the state (Tesón, 1998).  
Finally, in line with the constructivist approach adopted for this thesis, the effect social 
norms are also acknowledged as a source of laws and the interpretations of them when they reach 
international courts (Reus-Smit, 2004). Just as institutions set the framework for state behavior, 
normative structures are also argued to have the same effect. The knowledge shared within such 
structures shape the beliefs of actors and consequently affects their interests. To understand the 
behavior of states or other groups, their social identities need to be understood. These social 
identities in turn have implications for the interests and behaviors of states. At the heart of 
constructivism is the concept of “reasons for action” to understand state behavior (Reus-Smit, 2004; 
22). For example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) reason for bombing Serbia was 
justified by the European normative framework of how states should treat their citizens and the 
international normative framework that defends basic human rights of all people. This perspective 
shows the ways in which social norms can also affect international institutional actions and policy 
and are a source as a result. 
4.1 Framework of International Law 
 
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
presents seven circumstances a nation or a people must fulfill in order to have a case for secession. 
These articles will form the background of the analysis whereupon articles from the aforementioned 
treaties, conventions, and declarations will also be added where there is an overlap. These are the 
seven articles from the Declaration, created by the U.N. that offer situations in which a region, 
country or a people have the right to secede. 
“1. The subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a 
denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an 
impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation, 2. All peoples have the right to self-
determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development, 3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or 
education preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence, 4. All armed 
action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent people shall cease in order to 
enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity 
of their national territory shall be respected, 5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-
Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have no yet attained independence, to 
transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in 
accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or 
colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom, 6. Any attempt aimed 
at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and 7. All 
states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-
interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples 
and their territorial integrity” (UN General Assembly, 1960). 
How international law reflects theory 
An important aspect of this thesis is to connect law and theory to gather the theoretical 
arguments for the right to secede under international law. Many any of the above circumstances can 
be linked to the requirements posed by Remedial Only Right and Primary Right Theories that are 
directly related or at least can be supportive of each other. Remedial Only Right Theories can be 
linked to many of the articles of the U.N.’s declarations and treaties in that they both claim that 
secession of a nation, group, or people is an effective remedy for cases where there are violations of 
human rights (Art. 1, UN General Assembly, 1960).  
Under Primary Right Theories, the Ascriptive Group theories are represented amongst the 
circumstances of the Declaration in that a nation or a “people” must represent a political unity that 
seeks self-government (Art. 2. UN General Assembly, 1960). There are clear correlations between 
the aforementioned theories and the standards presented above, however most circumstances grant 
the right to secede under remedial justifications more so than for Associative or Ascriptive 
characteristics. As a rule, the influence of international law by breaking the territorial integrity of a 
state can only happen in instances where an issue necessitates a remedy (Montevideo Convention, 
1966). ICJ’s ruling on unilateral declarations of independence also grant the right to secede on the 
grounds that it serves as a remedy to a conflict rather than as a general right based on common 
characteristics of a political or cultural matter. By Buchanan’s (1997) argument as well, Remedial 
Right Only theories reflect international law in reality much better by the account of minimal 
realism, meaning that international legal institutions are much more likely to adopt secessionist 
claims based on Remedial Right Only theories than on Primary Right theories (pg. 5).  
Theory on the principle and preservation of territorial integrity 
Buchanan suggests that territorial integrity is the “single most fundamental principle of 
international law” (Buchanan, 1997; 5). Rather than only serving in the self-interest of states, 
Buchanan (1997) argues that territorial integrity is a morally charged principle that also serves in 
the interest of individuals. Some, such as Horowitz (2003), suggest that states are the only providers 
of rights to individuals and that states must be preserved in order to provide citizens with those 
rights as consistently as possible. States promoting territorial integrity within international law not 
only supports their claim to preserve the state but also to further two moral goals: 1) The stability of 
individuals’ rights and protection, and 2) It provides a platform with which individuals and groups 
can take part in political process that will affect generations (Buchanan, 1997). Horowitz (2003) 
also argues for maintenance of states’ status, as a changing political unity cannot offer the same 
platform to progress moral goals as a stable state. Combined with these two goals, territorial 
integrity is an important principle states look to maintain and preserve in discussions of 
international relations. 
4.2 Cases of Kosovo and Crimea 
 
The power of international law might appear inconsequential since it “contains no 
prohibition on declarations of independence” (Tanner & Stevenson, 2010) nor the right to grant a 
group the right to secede. However international institutions have had to give judgment on domestic 
political matters and have the decision followed accordingly. Two examples have been chosen as 
examples of the rulings of international institutions as their stance on when and why a region has 
the right to secede or declare independence: Kosovo and Crimea. Kosovo and Crimea are chosen as 
they are two of the most recent and influential cases to get the attention of international institutions 
and, generally, the political world. The opinions and judgments on the cases of Kosovo and Crimea 
will show where international law stands in matters of secession at their most recent. As previous 
state actions and rulings have been argued to set precedents for future law, these two examples will 
thus provide a framework for establishing the legality of Basque and Scottish secession.  
Kosovo 
The recent history of Kosovo’s conflict with Serbia begins with tensions among the 
ethnically distinct Albanians to the state’s Serbs. Tensions rose until the eruption of the Kosovo 
War between 1998 and 1999 during which intervention by NATO was required (Lambeth, 2001). 
Violations of human rights were reported on both parts of the conflict, particularly on the army of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as well as on the air raid attacks of NATO. At the end of 
the war, the United Nations Security Council issued resolution 1244 to bring an end to the violence 
in the region. The resolution asked for FRY armed forces to withdraw from Kosovo, agree to have 
Kosovo under U.N. interim administration, ensure the return of refugees and displaced people, help 
decide the future status of Kosovo, while reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
FRY (UNSC Resolution 1244, 1999). 
In 2008, Kosovo declared independence with protest from Serbia. As the matter was already 
an international issue, the ICJ was summoned to resolve the dispute. Before the decision was made 
by the ICJ, a hearing took place with statements for and against the declaration of independence 
from all the UN member states, including Serbia and Kosovo (ICJ, 2009). Points argued against the 
legality of the declaration made references to resolution 1244 that protected FRY’s territorial 
integrity and that the Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions had no right to declare a right to secede 
unilaterally. Statements in favor mentioned human rights protections, the promise of deciding a 
status for Kosovo under resolution 1244, and that the principle of territorial integrity only applies to 
other external, not to internal actors (ICJ, 2009). Of interest for this thesis are the statements made 
by the U.K. and Spanish governments. U.K., hesitantly, made points in favor of the declaration of 
independence, while Spain was the only western European country to vote and make a statement 
against the unilateral declaration of independence. The U.K. voted in favor of the legality of the 
declaration of independence with careful wording of their statement since rulings on the 
international scale could affect politics within their own country with regards to Scotland.  
The representative of the U.K., Foreign Secretary William Hague welcomed the decision of 
the ICJ that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not break international law, however ensured 
that this was a unique case that did not set a precedent (Hague, 2010). With this statement, the U.K. 
rules that unilateral declarations of independence are not the norm, but was legal in this case given 
the context, so as not to set precedent for other cases such (e.g. Scotland). Spanish Deputy Prime 
Minister María Teresa Fernández de la Vega claimed that Spain will not recognize Kosovo as an 
independent state, adding that the case of Catalonia “has absolutely nothing to do with it [Kosovo],” 
dismissing any similarities between the two (Novinite, 2010). The effect of this statement and the 
official stance of Spain are thus that no unilateral declarations will be accepted and instead must be 
negotiated mutually (Ibid). 
Amidst the implications that a unilateral declaration could set a precedent for other 
separatist movements, the ICJ ruled that the declaration was not illegal for the fact that 
“international law contains no prohibition on the declarations of independence” (ICJ Reports, 2010; 
84). The advisory opinion also stated the facts that the principle of territorial integrity only applied 
to inter-state relations and not within states. Since it was a matter between regions within Serbia, the 
principle of territorial integrity was not recognized. The opinion also made references to other 
decisions against the unilateral declarations of independence and reminded the international 
community that the decisions to those declarations were treated as case by case and that they were 
judged, not for the unilateral character of their declarations, but for the unlawful and violent acts 
their declarations supposed (ICJ Reports, 2010).  
Finally, the opinion made reference to resolution 1244 for its function on the legality of the 
unilateral declaration. The opinion stated that there was no mention of a termination of the 
Resolution and that the issue remained an international matter. As effect of this, the ICJ declared the 
legality of the influence of external actors (i.e. the U.N.) as it was no longer an internal matter based 
on the violations of human rights. The opinion ruled that based on the statements of resolution 
1244, the future status of Kosovo would still be in question under the Provisional Government set 
up by the U.N., thus legitimizing the rule of the ICJ on this issue (ICJ Reports, 2010).  
Rules on declarations of independence will almost always require a ruling relevant to the 
specific context. As the ICJ mentions in their report, this ruling on the legality of the unilateral 
declaration of independence of Kosovo does not set a precedent for other similar conflicts (ICJ 
Reports, 2010). Frameworks are necessary to have to set boundaries, expectations and standards 
that promote a moral duty, however nearly any case regarding international law will always have to 
be considered individually. Nearly all cases with international consequences will have to be dealt 
with context-specifically if a case is to be settled with justice. 
In conclusion, the ICJ states, by unanimous decision, that the court has jurisdiction to 
provide an advisory opinion due to its internationality set forth by its previous intervention of the 
UN in Kosovo during warfare and established by resolution 1244 (ICJ Reports, 1244). Further, with 
the statements made in resolution 1244 as to its pending status and political process that was not 
repealed, the court decided that the unilateral declaration of independence set forth by the elected 
“peoples” of Kosovo did not violate international law. With this ruling, though the EU itself cannot 
formally recognize the new status of Kosovo, it has urged the remaining states of the union that 
have not recognized Kosovo’s independence to do so (European Parliament, 2012).  
Crimea 
Similar to the situation in Kosovo, a Russian-speaking area of Ukraine – Crimea – had a 
referendum on the matter of their independence from Ukraine (Economist, 2014). The referendum 
gave their voters only two choices; to restore the 1992 Constitution for greater autonomy as part of 
Ukraine or, to join Russia as one of its federal subjects. However, they would not get the choice of 
keeping the status quo. If the referendum, that took take place in Crimea, were to be successful, it 
would go against Article 73 of the Ukrainian Constitution which claims that “Alterations to the 
territory of Ukraine shall be resolved exclusively by the All-Ukrainian referendum” (Economist, 
2014). The results of the referendum showed that 96.77% of the Crimean population was in favor of 
joining the Russian Federation with Russia recognizing the results on the same day (Russia Today, 
2014). However a UN General Assembly meeting declared the referendum as invalid and voted, 
with 100 votes for and 11 against, for a resolution while maintaining the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine and urging states and international actors not to recognize any change in the status of 
Crimea (UN General Assembly, A/RES/68/262, 2014). 
Like in the Kosovo case, citizens of Crimea have an Ascriptive Group characteristic that 
gives them a case for the right to secede through Primary Right Theories. The majority of the 
population of Crimea are ethnic Russians and the majority speak Russian (UKR Census, 2001). 
Crimea also fulfils the requirement set by Associative Group Theories by having over 96.77% of 
the voting population in accordance, voting in favor of joining the Russian Federation. Along with 
the similarities, there are also difference between Kosovo and Crimea that have given it a different 
ruling.  
First, the Russian-aided Crimea were judged to be the perpetrator of violent acts and human 
rights violations since Russian forces entered Ukraine in the hopes of taking what they have argued 
was rightfully theirs (Marzsal, 2015). Second, the content of the referendum was judged invalid in 
its inclusion of only two options; 1) to either receive greater autonomy from the Ukrainian 
government or, 2) to separate and join Russia as one of its federal subjects (Economist, 2014). 
Eleven days after the referendum, the UN General Assembly ruled that the actions taken by Russia 
and Crimea meant that annexation of Crimea was not legal as it undermined the territorial integrity 
of Ukraine broken by Russian intervention (UN General Assembly, A/RES/68/252, 2014). Further, 
they urged all parties involved to seek a peaceful resolution and to restrain from any further violent 
actions. As such, the majority of states recognized the rulings of the international institutions 
whereby Crimea is considered as part of Ukraine, while Kosovo is taking steps towards 
establishment of its government and status by international institutions (European Commission, 
2013). 
Sub-conclusion 
In relation to the theories mentioned above, having Ascriptive or Associative Group Theory 
characteristics was not disregarded when the decision was not to grant secession but was mentioned 
as a reason for the decision to grant secession. Primary Right theories were considered legitimate 
and used as part of a reason for secession, but were not a deciding factor. One of the main deciding 
factors is laid upon identifying the initiator or perpetrator of violence. Unlike in Kosovo, the 
Crimean side presented a violent front supplied by Russian forces. This proved to work against the 
Crimean case in defending its position as a legitimately seceded region.  
The UN General Assembly ruled in favor of upholding territorial integrity rights for Ukraine 
but ruled in favor of secession with the statement that international law does not prohibit 
declarations of independence (Tanner & Stevenson, 2010). The logic found in these decisions is 
based on the fact of international intervention found in the former case, but not in the latter. The UN 
General Assembly legitimized the secession of Kosovo as a remedy to the conflict existing between 
the Kosovar region and Serbia, however made no such declarations on the part of Crimea, where it 
was not possible to apply a Remedial Right Only Theory reason for secession. This final ruling is 
attributed to the specified situations of each case that required different rulings, such as the 
involvement of violence from the Serbian side in the case of Kosovo and Russia’s involvement – 
siding with Crimea – in the case of Crimea. 
Interestingly, although the rulings were contradictory in legal terms, the rulings were in 
favor of the U.S.’s opinion both times. Although the context of each case must still be 
acknowledged, the fact that both rulings went in favor of U.S.’s statements is suggestive of the 
influence politics has within international law. In this view, law takes the perspective of not being 
just “rules” but instead take on a normative perspective. As Henkin (1979) explains, just as 
domestic law expresses the principles and norms of a society, international law expresses those 
same principles, however rather than persons making up the constituency of law, it is states that 
govern the society of international law. Though the relationship between the two is complex, the 
result in international law sometimes reflects the power of major political entities in that society or 
system (Reus-Smit, 2004). In line with the general constructivist approach, the role of international 
law is seen as “a broad social phenomenon, deeply embedded in the practices, beliefs, and traditions 
of societies, and shaped by interactions among societies” (Reus-Smit, 2004; 3). Within this view, 
the role of U.S. politics in international law is seen as influential and affective to international law 
and rulings. 
As with the ruling on Kosovo, Crimea’s ruling from the U.N. is not preceded by an 
unbreakable set of standards but based upon context-specific facts which ruled each case 
accordingly. This makes it difficult to create a coherent understanding of international law on 
secession. However, based on the rulings, certain factors can be extracted to gather a coherent 
understanding of legitimate reasons to secede: 1) Absence of violence and violations of basic 
human rights, 2) International political favorability (e.g. Being in U.S.’s favor), 3) Ascriptive Group 
theory characteristics, 4) Associative Group theory characteristics, 5) Remedial resolutions based 
on violations of human rights (Remedial Right Only Theories).  
With the knowledge that these rulings are highly contextual and that intervention of 
international law requires an awareness of case-specific situations, the points gathered from the 
previous two examples will be used as terms of international law to analyze the legitimacy of 
secession in the cases of Scotland and the Basque Country. Scotland and the Basque Country would 
require a context-specific ruling on their cases as well, however since none exist, these rulings offer 
the most recent and most relevant terms reflective of international law that can be applied to the two 
main cases. 
How international rulings reflects theory 
 The international rulings presented here, and theory in general, differ in that theory always 
stands true for hypothetical situations, whereas international law deals with real situations and are 
flexible to each according case. Nevertheless, there are aspects within these rulings and opinions 
that reflect theories of secession and are compatible or are referenced to, directly or indirectly. As 
was observed above, both cases presented instances of human rights violations and violent actions. 
In both cases, the violence was condemned and rulings went in favor of the victim. In the Kosovo 
case, Kosovars were granted the right to secede as a remedial right (ICJ Reports, 2010). On the 
other hand, in Russian-aided Crimea, the territorial integrity of Ukraine was favored (UN General 
Assembly, A/RES/68/252, 2014), not only for the violence but because the referendum was 
considered unfair and therefore invalid (Economist, 2014). Both of these aspects of the cases may 
be attributed to what Buchanan (1997) calls ‘minimal realism,’ in which international law is most 
likely to adopt secessionist claims which least propose threat to the primary law makers, i.e. states.  
 Apart from Remedial Right Only Theories, Primary Rights are also reflected. In the case of 
Kosovo, reference was made more so to the Associative aspects, than Ascriptive aspects of Primary 
Right Theories, as support to rule in favor of secession (ICJ Reports, 2010). The opinion ruled that 
it was the “will of the people” for Kosovo to separate from Serbia and govern itself (ICJ Reports, 
2010; 112). More indirectly, in the case of Crimea, the unanimous vote in favor of separating from 
Ukraine and to join Russia was not disregarded for the fact of the plebiscite, but for its asserted 
unfairness (Economist, 2014; UN General Assembly, A/RES/68/252, 2014). However in either 
case, the mention of ascriptive characteristics was not mentioned explicitly as justification of 
secession, but referenced to as support of the decision. Ascriptive characteristics are a relevant 
aspect in ruling in favor of secession, but not a critical factor in deciding the right to secession. 
How Scotland and the Basque Country fit into international law empirically 
With this common set of standards observed to be in international law according to UN 
articles and the two examples, these standards will be used to apply to the two main cases of this 
thesis; Scotland and the Basque Country. As with Kosovo and Crimea, the effects of Scotland and 
the Basque Country also have international consequences the UN and UN member states would be 
interested in regulating for the effect it would have on international relations and state politics 
(Sohn, 1995). As a result, the role of international law completes the circle, as the rulings of 
international institutions affect domestic politics and the politics within states affect international 
institutions (Reus-Smit, 2004). The rulings of Kosovo and Crimea, although they do not set 
precedents for domestic politics, do have an influence. For example, Russia saw Crimea’s secession 
as legitimate by citing Kosovo’s secession and arguing using the same statements (Economist, 
2014). The rejection of the declaration from the international community is attributed to the 
methods used in placing the referendum, such as the use of violence and an invalid referendum. By 
view of precedential influence, what happened in Scotland have sparked debates for current 
secession cases, and what happens in the Basque Country could influence future cases of secession 
and the stance of international law on secession (Kemp, 2014). 
5. Analysis 
5.1 Primary Right Theories of Secession 
 
 Primary Right Theories of Secession present the least obstacles for secession, where the 
only requirement is for groups to be in accordance as to what their status should be. It is also the 
most criticized by theorists with a consideration for international law (Buchanan, 1997; Horowitz, 
2003). Scotland will be presented first under the terms of Primary Right Theories as it is the 
example of a successful referendum that can then be compared to the Basque Country. The Basque 
case will be presented afterwards under the same theories so that similarities and differences 
become apparent. The section will finish with a sub-conclusion of the findings of this section. 
Scotland 
 Under the Ascriptive Group theories of Primary Right theories, the group in question are to 
fulfill ascriptive characteristics to be granted the right to secede. These characteristics involve 
culture, language, history, and a sense of distinction amongst the group. However no political 
organization that joins this group need to exist for the group to be granted the right to secede.  
In Scotland, a language unique to the region exists (Scottish Gaelic), however use of the 
language is very sparse. Scottish Gaelic was not even formally recognized in the Scottish 
Parliament until very recently, in 2005, passed as the Gaelic Language Act (Legislation, 2006). The 
Act gave Scottish Gaelic “equal respect” to that of English, and is promoted with education 
particularly in mind. Since the Act was enacted, the number of primary school children enrolled in 
Gaelic education increased from 2,480 in 2005 to 3,583 in 2014, 0.53% of all students in Scotland 
(Census, 2011). In total, 1.1% of the population of Scotland speak Gaelic as of 2011 (Census, 
2011). Although no official threshold exists for the level of usage to be considered an ascriptive 
characteristic, such sparse use of the language among the population cannot include language as an 
ascriptive characteristic of Scotland. Language does not constitute as part of Scottish ascriptive 
characteristics that distinguish Scots from their neighbors since, though a language exists, it is used 
very little. 
 Culture is a difficult characteristic to measure and as no measurement of culture within 
secession theory exists. For a close measurement, this thesis will include instances of Scottish 
culture that deem it to be particular to Scotland. The evaluation of culture as well as the other 
aspects of ascriptive characteristics will not give a definitive answer to their status according to 
Ascriptive Group theories but will intend to show the extent to which Scotland are said to have their 
own unique culture. Within all the major areas of what culture constitutes, there appears to be 
aspects unique to Scotland. In sports, Scotland have their own soccer team that is officially 
recognized and competes in international sporting events. It also represents the Highland Games, a 
set of rural games unique to Scotland (VisitScotland, 2015). Scottish music is also well known, 
epitomized by the Great Highland Bagpipes which is played in various celebrations of Scottish 
heritage (Cannon, 1988). Scotland also has manifestations of its own in genres of more modern 
music such as in hip-hop and punk-rock, known as Gaelic punk (MacÀdhaim, 2005). Literature, art, 
media, and cuisine all have recognizable Scottish traits that come from Scottish identified, artists, 
writers, actors, directors, chefs, players, philosophers and scientists.
4
  
 The history of Scottish people dates back to about the 9
th
 century when the Kingdom of 
Alba – referring to the origins of the Kingdom of Scotland – was formed through the merger of the 
Pictish and Gaelic kings (Yorke, 2006). From here, wars between Scottish kingdoms and their 
neighbors have generally been referred to in the effort to distinguish Scotland from the rest of the 
British Isles. The Wars of Independence in the 13
th
 and 14
th
 centuries between the Kingdom of 
Scotland and the Kingdom of England became defining eras of Scottish history and their struggle to 
maintain an independent territory from England and later from the United Kingdom (Prestwich, 
2005). The Wars of the Three Kingdoms, between England, Ireland and Scotland, further 
perpetuated the struggle to maintain an independent Scotland (Scott, 2003). However as centuries 
have passed, Scotland has ebb and flowed from a governing body based in London. There have 
been times of greater political union (Richardson, 2012), as well as a recent history of political 
devolution with referenda’s in between 1997 and 1998 that has allowed Scotland to return its law-
making power back to Scotland by establishing a Scottish Parliament (Scotland Act, 1998). Literary 
movements, enlightenment, and political progression throughout the centuries have generally made 
Scotland distinct both in times of integration and disintegration. By the account given above, 
Scotland also appears to have a history of their own that give them a separate characteristic as 
accounted for by Ascriptive Group Theories. 
The best indication of Scottish distinctiveness however, come from opinion polls asking 
Scottish citizens whether they identify themselves as Scottish, British, ‘other’ or any combination 
and mix of the three. The polling put together by Whatscotlandthinks (2015), took opinions of the 
Scottish citizens of whether they identify themselves as Scottish, British, or other. With binary 
options, the latest results of the public opinion polls in March of 2015 showed that 62% of the 
population considered themselves as Scottish while 31% felt British (Whatscotlandthinks, 2015). 
Among young people (14-17 years), and with greater variability between identities, 39% feel 
equally British and Scottish, while 38% feel more Scottish than British. Two percent feel British 
and not Scottish, while 15% feel Scottish and not British (Whatscotlandthinks, 2014). Though there 
are also feelings of Britishness, the indication is that most people in Scotland feel more Scottish 
than British, either completely or to a degree. For the review given above, Scotland showcases a 
distinct culture and shows that the majority of Scottish people identify with the territory and 
themselves as different from the rest of the United Kingdom.  
 The various aspects of culture and history culminate in feeling a sense of distinction for 
Scotland and Scottish people. Though language does not play as important of a role for the 
distinction between Scottish and English people, it does exist and is a part of some aspects of 
Scottish culture. The recent political history of Scotland has begun to recognize this distinction 
starting with the foundation of the Scottish National Party (SNP) which started with little success, 
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up to the most recent U.K. general elections in which an overwhelming majority of Scottish citizens 
gave 56 of the 59 seats to SNP MP’s (Telegraph, 2015). Scotland thus fit into the descriptions of 
Ascriptive Group theories as a distinct entity, as the culture, history and opinion polls show. 
Associative Group theories are theories which claim that groups have the right to secede 
under the requirement that all, or at least the majority of its members voluntarily agree to form a 
political unit (Buchanan, 1997). Under this theory, group members do not need to have any 
characteristics in common other than the opinion that they should form their own political unit. 
Many would argue that this is an important aspect of a nation or region to secede, however few 
argue from an international law perspective that this be the only requirement. Scotland is currently 
in a position in which they appear to favor greater autonomy but do not wish to be fully independent 
as the results of the recent Scottish referendum and process of devolution have showed (The 
Guardian, 2014). Scotland voted for the SNP by a large majority in the U.K. general elections 
however there are other political issues other than the fight for independence in debate at such 
elections. The Scottish referendum in September of 2014 gives the best impression of where 
Scottish citizens stand in the question of independence. The results showed that Scottish people are 
happier with devolution and bringing power to Scottish institutions, and would not like full 
independence (The Guardian, 2014). By Associative Group arguments Scotland thus fail to be 
granted the rights to secede as the majority are not in favor of forming a political unit in favor of 
secession. 
Basque Country 
 Under Ascriptive Group theories, the Basque Country also has a strong case for right to 
secede. This right given under Ascriptive Group theories holds that a group must possess similar 
characteristics that unite them, language being one of them. One of the most important factors of 
Basque identity is the language, Euskara. The nomenclature for a Basque person, Euskaldun, is 
given to the person that has the ability to speak Basque, (Azurmendi, Bachoc, & Zabaleta, 2001). 
Since Basque was also prohibited language up until recently, the repression has been met with 
campaigns, rallies, and policies to promote Basque in public institutions and especially in schools. 
Still, Basque speakers are not among the majority within the Basque Country. According to the 
latest survey in 2012, only 720,000 people speak Basque between the Autonomous Community of 
the Basque Country, Navarre, and the French Basque Country – around 27% of the whole 
population (Gobierno Vasco, 2012). The low number of speakers can be attributed to a generational 
gap in which many citizens were not able to learn Basque because they were raised during Franco’s 
Spain (Clark, 1979). In effect, the percentage of Basque speakers would increase notably if the 
survey had accounted for citizens below the age of 16 (Gobierno Vasco, 2012). Despite that Basque 
speakers are in the minority in the Basque Country itself, the language forms a big part of Basque 
identification and can be seen as an Ascriptive characteristic of Basque people. 
 The Basque Country also celebrates its culture through food, sport, music, festivals, 
holidays, and arts that are unique to its region. Basque cuisine is a soaring attraction throughout the 
Iberian Peninsula and increasingly throughout the world. The modern Basque kitchen is becoming 
very popular highlighted by the numerous Michelin-starred restaurants (World’s 50 Best, 2014). 
However traditional Basque cuisine is also regarded as a distinct trait identifiable to the Basque 
Country, most often referred to by the hundreds of cider-houses, ‘sagardotegiak,’ that serve its 
regional traditional cider alongside what has been considered a traditional meal of the Basque 
Country (Meehan, 2005). Basque music also has its part in Basque society in traditional and modern 
forms. In the same vein as Scottish Gaelic punk, the Basque Country has also produced a number of 
its own punk bands – in a movement known as Basque Radical Rock – that sing anti-system songs 
that express their discontent against the Spanish government, especially during its transition 
towards democracy (La Factoria del Ritmo, 2015). Traditional songs accompanied by dances and 
instruments particular to the region are also a big part of festivals celebrating Basque culture, 
known as ‘Euskal Jaiak’ (Donostia Kultura, 2015). In the same ‘Euskal Jaiak’ celebrations and 
demonstrations of Basque sports can also be exhibited in a series of Basque rural sports (‘Herri 
Kirolak’), regattas (or boat races), and Basque pelota (Esku pilota). Literature, art, media, 
mythology and various other aspects of Basque culture add to the rich uniqueness of the Basque 
people. 
 Likewise, Basque history is often referred to when speaking of Basque distinctiveness. Their 
long mystical history is often connected to the unique genetic make-up of Basques (Rodríguez-
Ezpeleta, Álvarez-Busto, Imaz, et al., 2010) as well as the origins of their isolated language 
(Danver, 2015). The origin of the Basque people is first attributed to a tribe known as the Vascones 
who inhabited the area along the western part of the Pyrenees (Collins, 1987). The Vascones, whose 
capital rested in Pamplona, created the Kingdom of Pamplona, which then became the Kingdom of 
Navarre, after fighting off the Franks from the north and the Visigoths from the South (Collins, 
1990). Numerous wars, pacts and treaties between the kingdoms of the area moved the borders of 
the Kingdom of Navarre until in 1512, Ferdinand II of Aragon conquered Navarre and split the 
Kingdom – helped by a previous civil war – between what is roughly now the borders between the 
Chartered Community of Navarre and the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (500 
años de conquista). Unpopular laws and tax policies that did not sit well with the charters of the 
region – ‘fueros’ – led to rebellions to restore their laws and degree of self-government (Collins, 
1990). Ensuing wars and losses on the part of the Kingdom of Navarre meant they slowly began to 
lose their laws and territory to an increasingly stronger unified Spain. The regions remained 
separated up until the Spanish Civil War in which Francisco Franco established a totalitarian nation 
state, making Spain a singular entity (Collins, 1990). Franco’s regime sought to demolish the 
languages and cultures of the regions of Spain, which provoked the most extreme reaction by the 
Basque people with the creation of ETA who used organized violence in response (Collins, 1990). 
The transition towards democracy and the new statute of autonomy continued to provoke Basque 
independentist sentiments which many Basque nationalists did not feel represented their interests. 
Though a procress of devolution has taken place in the Basque Country, giving them more power in 
most areas of policy creation, the struggle for an independent Basque Country continues to this day.  
 Ascriptive Group theories require a set of characteristics to form a legitimate right to secede, 
the Basque Country’s language, culture and history appear to show a very distinct, though 
nevertheless complex nation, as any nation usually is. Language forms the least telling 
characteristics of Basque people, though this can be seen as an effect of the recent repression of 
language and culture put in place by the Franco dictatorship. Still, culturally and historically, the 
Basque nation shows to have its own set of customs that survive to this day and are markers of the 
Basque nation. Under Ascriptive Group theories, the Basque nation would have a legitimate right to 
secede.  
 However, secession is a lot more complicated than the mere unification of a group by a set 
of common characteristics. Starting from the theories with one of the fewest obstacles to obtain 
secession, Associative Group theories maintains that a majority within a group need to be in 
agreement that they would like to form a political unit. Given the greater Basque Country’s history 
explained above, the unification of opinions to their status proves to be difficult. The borders that 
envelop the cultural Basque Country are impossible to pin under an existing political party as there 
exist three different constituencies within it and two states which govern them, France and Spain. 
The ruling political parties of each region are varied in name and opinion. However even within 
each province of the greater Basque Country there are differences of opinion as to what their status 
should be with no overwhelming majority.  
The Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (ACBC) has elected the Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV
5) in government for most of the ACBC’s existence. The PNV has had to 
form coalitions however with both right-of-center and leftist Basque nationalist parties both, 
showing the split and differences of opinion between Basque citizens. Part of the problem also lies 
in the illegalization of nationalist parties which make it difficult to mobilize nationalist opinions in 
the Basque Country (Turano, 2003). Since 2011, EH Bildu has been the party representing the 
leaders of previously illegalized parties such as Herri Batasuna (Nichols, 2012). This group differs 
from the PNV’s stance, in that they are often more left-leaning and are more extreme in their pursuit 
for independence (Lewis, 2015). The PNV has asked for a referendum asking for independence 
proposed by then president (lehendakari) of the Basque Country Juan Jose Ibarretxe, however the 
referendum was not allowed to go through as it was deemed unconstitutional. The status ACBC 
citizen’s desire remains officially unknown. In Navarre, the Navarrese People’s Union (UPN6) or 
the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE
7
) have switched between each other to govern the 
region, neither of which with an agenda towards independence. Since France is a centralized state, 
Basque nationalist parties have had little room for influence though some are elected in municipal 
elections.  
To get a better perception of the political disparities within the people of the Basque 
Country, the latest results of the Euskobarómetro (2014) will be used. In terms of national identity 
and feeling, there exists a duality similar as the one seen in Scotland. In the latest results of the data 
gathered by the Euskobarómetro team in November of 2014, polls showed that 35% felt both 
Spanish and Basque equally, 25% felt more Basque than Spanish, 33% felt only Basque, while 4% 
felt more Spanish than Basque, and 5% felt only Spanish. Politically speaking however, the 
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question of secession presents different results than the polls of identity might suggest. In the same 
inquiry, 56% of the Basque society declared themselves “not nationalists” while 42% declared 
themselves “nationalists” (Euskobarómetro, 2014). Similarly, opinions show that most people favor 
the current autonomic status at 36%, 22% are in favor of independence and 6% want a centralized 
Basque Country as a part of Spain. The varied opinions and parties that exist make the Basque 
Country appear to be a non-unified group with a majority happy with the status quo and not seeking 
independence.  Therefore the Basque Country cannot be given the right to secede on the fact of their 
incongruence. 
Basque devolved powers  
 Here, the public powers of the Basque Country according to the 1979 Gernika Statute, and 
the process of devolution since then, will be presented. The Statute of Gernika is the document 
recognized by the Spanish Constitution, which grants the Basque Country the ability to self-govern 
as an autonomous community. The statute grants the Autonomous Community of the Basque 
Country its political and financial autonomy, as well as certain legislative and executive 
competencies. The process of devolution has brought further competencies in sectors such as in 
taxes, health care, public safety and education (Bizkaiatalent, 2015). However among all the 
competencies granted to the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, some aspects such as 
penitentiary legislation, labor legislation, defense and armed forces remain under national 
jurisdiction. Among these, penitentiary legislation is the most important of them since the treatment 
of political prisoners affects the independence issue in the Basque Country. The government of the 
Basque Country enjoys many powers, similar to what Scotland have achieved after the referendum 
established their stay with the United Kingdom.  With such powers, they show to have a large 
degree of autonomy within Spain. Secession, or independence, would mean a finalization of the 
separation that would include a resolution to issue of terrorism and political prisoners, greater rights 
in the international sphere, as well as an act of recognition as an independent state. 
 Like the opinion polls of what Basques think the political status of the Basque Country 
should be, most show that they are also happy with the Statute of Gernika and would vote ‘yes’ 
again. Overall, it means they would like to keep the status quo. While in 1979, 53% of the voting 
population (including abstentions), voted in favor of the statute, 38% of citizens voted in favor for 
the statute in 2014 in the Basque Country while 10% voted against it. Somewhat similarly, 32% 
claim they are completely satisfied with the statute, 41% are partially satisfied (with more and less 
devolution being asked), and 15% are completely unsatisfied (Euskobarómetro, 2014). The latest 
results obtained of the Basque population shows a preference in favor of the current status with 
some changes, but no majority asks for independence. 
5.2 Remedial Right Only Theories of Secession 
 
 Remedial Right Only Theories more closely overlap the standards set by 
international law. For this reason they could be seen as more legitimate reasons for secession and 
are usually the standards that are regarded when assessing a case for secession (Buchanan, 1997). 
Following the same order as the previous section, first the Scottish case will be presented under 
Remedial Right Only Theories followed by the Basque Country. As they are both in similar 
political contexts, there should be little difference as to what their status should be according to 
these theories.  
Rules and laws are always open to interpretation and the right to secede that is given by the 
theories presented can also always mean to include the Scottish or Basque people based on this 
caveat of interpretation. Though the rules for the right to secede given in the theory section do not 
include a standardization of the basic human rights, this thesis will take the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Assembly, 1948), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for their geopolitical 
relevance, as its standards for what basic human rights entail (Assembly, 1948).  
For the use of the terms of international standards and laws, the timeframe in which they are 
applicable will be from the time they are created to the present. However, the theories of Remedial 
Right Only provide no such timeframe. Since the theories explain that violations are grounds for 
secession, the time in which they are considered relevant thus need a framework, otherwise the 
theories could include violations from any point in history. For this purpose, the thesis will take the 
timeframe based on Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
as its standard for a valid timeframe as it offers the greatest scope and fuses the relation of laws and 
theories closer together. The Declaration grants that the groups who have had their territories 
annexed or occupied after 1945 have a legitimate case to secede. This timeframe will be also be 
used to grant validity of incurred injustices as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
Scotland 
In its most basic explanation, the theories of Remedial Right Only grant a nation the right to 
secede when certain injustices have been made against the group in question. In effect, they are 
allowed to separate from the unjust state as a remedy. The first of these injustices, proposed by 
Buchanan (1997), explains that a group has the right to secede when “the physical survival of its 
members is threatened by actions of the state or it suffers violations of other basic human rights” 
(Buchanan, 1997; 36). Scotland is part of a developed democratic state that belongs to the European 
Union. The physical survival of the Scottish people or citizens of the country are not in danger in 
any way nor have they been in the given timeframe. There have been many wars and disputes 
between Scottish and English kingdoms and governments over the centuries; however genocide or a 
systematic killing of the Scottish people has not been an issue for the Scottish people, and certainly 
not since 1945. 
Given the vast array of rights that are listed in the Declaration, some may be interpreted to 
include to the Scottish case. The gray area falls on the interpretation of what constitutes as a 
violation of the rights and freedoms citizens are said to possess. For example Article 15.1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone has the right to a nationality” and 
further 15.2 states that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to 
change his nationality.” If Scottish people feel that they are not rightly represented by their current 
nationality, then they have a claim of a human right violation. Currently, Scottish people are 
internationally recognized as citizens of the United Kingdom and hold British passports. This may 
be argued to be an instance of deprivation of a human right as just reason for the Scottish people to 
given the right to secede. However, the contexts in which remedial rights to secession are given 
concern more extreme contexts. Thus, Scotland is not granted the right to secede under a violation 
of a human right.  
The second point Buchanan lists as a violation worthy of a remedial right to secede is that a 
group has had “its previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken by the state” (Buchanan, 1997; 
36). Given the timeframe in which the theories and laws are applied, the issue of unjustly taken 
territory does not enter debate as Scotland had already formed as part of union in the creation of the 
Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707 (Parliament, 2015). The union that created the parliament of the 
United Kingdom was formed voluntarily by both Kingdoms, thus no annexation or conquest was 
required for the creation of the union. 
By both accounts of the remedial right to secede, Scotland do not have a case for the right to 
secede under these theories. The only gray area that exists for the Scottish right to secede under 
remedial rights may exist in the interpretations of what count as violations of basic human rights. 
Even if the deprivation of the right to nationality can be extended to the Scottish case, the violations 
of human rights remedial theories aim to solve are usually of a graver matter where the groups in 
question suffer more extreme conditions. For this part of the Remedial Right Only Theories, it 
would thus be safer to argue against a remedial right mode of secession for Scotland as, although it 
is not explicit about the specifics of human rights, it most likely does not relate to the Scottish case. 
Basque Country 
 The Basque Country presents an interesting case on the matters of remedial right because its 
complicated situation leaves much up for debate and discussion. Specifically, the role of terrorism, 
the victimization of it, and the managing of it has created lots of problems and a particular context 
to deal with the right to secession. As in the previous section, the Basque case will be put under the 
terms set by Remedial Right Only Theories to examine the extent to which the Basque Country has 
the right to secede.  
 The first statement under Remedial Only Right Theories that grant the right to secede under 
violations of human rights is when “the physical survival of its members is threatened by actions of 
the state or it suffers violations of other basic human rights” (Buchanan, 1997; 36), the group in 
question has the right to secede. First, like Scotland in the U.K., the Basque Country is also a part of 
a developed, democratic country in the E.U. in which it is highly unlikely for a genocide or 
systematic killing of a particular people or nation to take place. Therefore, similarly to Scotland, the 
Basque Country are not be granted the right to secede on the grounds that the survival of its people 
is in danger in the state of Spain. 
 The question of the violation of basic human rights however is much more nuanced in the 
Basque case that in the Scottish one because of the involvement of terrorism in politics. Like in 
Scotland, the deprivation of nationality could also be an issue for the Basque Country. However, 
part of the purpose the Basque case is to show other facets of the secession debate. The issue of 
terrorism brings a few matters for the Basque case for secession through remedial rights. For one, 
the imprisonment and treatment of independence advocates, reports of torture of its prisoners, and 
the illegalization of political parties find the bulk of possible issues human rights violations. As 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “no one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.” So far, as of the fifth of May, 2015, 
there have been six documented instances of torture of Basque prisoners at the hands of the Spanish 
police reported by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (Naiz, 2015). The documented 
cases are few, but more have been reported among the many that have not (Naiz2, 2015). Civil 
rights advocates have expressed that these are not isolated cases and deserve more attention (Naiz, 
2015).  
 In more general terms, the treatment of prisoners, their dispersion and the imprisonment at 
all, has been reported, questioned and protested throughout the Basque Country and sometimes 
through international mediation
8
. The CETIM (2013) statement reports that there are 606 (482 in 
2014
9
) political prisoners placed, on average, 720 kilometers from their place of origin in both 
Spain and France as of 2013. This has run unnecessary costs, for the prisoners and their families. 
Expenses for the travel of lawyers and family members make it difficult for prisoners to maintain 
security. Traffic accidents and deaths of family members have also been a consequence of the long 
distances. The treatment of ill prisoners has also been reported as insufficient (CETIM, 2013). This 
and other conditions put on the prisoners are a violation of many rights as per the ICESCR.  
 Finally, the long prison sentences ruled by Spain have been reported to breach its own and 
European Union’s law for sentencing ETA members to serve sentences beyond maximum periods 
of imprisonment. What became known as the Parot Doctrine, was the ruling in which the Supreme 
Court ruled Henri Parot to serve his individually given sentence of 3974 years rather than the state’s 
30-year maximum (EITB, 2013). When Inés del Río Prada was sentenced under similar terms, she 
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights which confirmed that her imprisonment “was a 
violation of Articles 5 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights which cover the right to 
no punishment without law, and the right to liberty and security” (BBC, 2013).  
For purpose of the analysis, the thesis will hold the position that the aforementioned human 
rights violations are not sufficient for a just cause of secession under remedial right only theories. 
The terms set under remedial right theories make no mention of which standards to use as 
measurement of human rights violations and use examples of violations that entail graver situations 
than the Basque Country experiences. For this reason, this thesis cannot assume the right to include 
instances of types of violations as legitimate grounds for secession into Remedial Only Right 
theories where it is not explicitly detailed and where the examples were provided were of more 
severe situations. However these examples serve to show the existence of human rights violations 
on Basque people and the discussions of secession based on those facts. Whether these violations of 
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human rights are grounds for legitimate secession is a discussion that will be mentioned in the 
forthcoming section (Discussion). 
The second point of Buchanan’s terms for just cause for a group’s secession is that “its 
previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken by the state” (Buchanan, 1997: 36). For the 
selected timeframe chosen, the Basque Country’s opportunity for a case would come under the 
transition period between Franco’s dictatorship and democracy. During the transition, once the new 
Constitution and Statutes of Autonomy that determined the status of the region’s of Spain were 
established, elections that allowed citizens to vote for or against the new terms were put in place in 
each region. The current Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, though with a 40% 
abstention, voted in the Statute of Gernika with 90.27% in favor and only 5.5% against the new 
terms set by the Spanish government (del Castillo Vera, 1980). According to Robert’s Rules of 
Order Newly Revised, abstention counts as a refusal to vote, thus it has no effect on the outcome of 
the election results (Robert, Robert, Evans, & Honemann, 2011). Spanish law counts the votes of 
those present, even if the majority abstain (Cañizares, 2015). Since the present voted ‘yes,’ the 
referendum is considered legitimate and stands. Thus, the Basque Country has no case for a just 
cause of secession under the term of having had its territory taken by Spain. 
Under both points of Buchanan’s (1997) right to secede under Remedial Only Right 
Theories, the Basque Country are observed to have no rights to secede under the given terms. 
Considering the types of human rights violations are of a different matter, they are observed here 
not to apply to the Basque Country’s case. This does not mean to demean the human rights 
violations against political prisoners in the Basque Country and should be taken into serious 
consideration. However, for the purpose of assessing the Basque Country’s right to secede under the 
terms of discussed theories, the results show no grounds for a right to secede. 
5.3 International Law under the UN Declaration 
 
The departure of international law comes from a respect of the laws of states (Art. 8, 
Montevideo Convention, 1933). As the cases of Kosovo and Crimea have shown, international 
institutions intervene only in the case where domestic politics become inadequate, or violent, that 
ultimately necessitate the guidance of a third party (Roethke, 2006).  The opinions and rulings from 
these cases will be used as a framework to assess how favorable international law is to the two 
cases. Furthermore, the UN’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, written in the 1960’s in the effort to undo colonialism, will also be used as a 
framework to gather the extent to which secession in Scotland and the Basque Country is viable.  
Though the cases of Scotland and the Basque Country are not colonized regions, they serve 
as useful examples for international law to add different contexts in which to offer secession that 
promotes moral progress. In order to do so, they will be applied to the documents of international 
law and the terms set by the examples of the opinions and rulings of the cases of Kosovo and 
Crimea. The result will show to what extent the cases of secession are legal and the following 
section will discuss whether this framework promotes or hinders political moral progression. 
 This section will attempt to accomplish the following. First, it will assess Scotland and the 
Basque Country’s stance in relation to the terms of international law as established in the section of 
the same name. As with the previous two sub-chapters, this will help reveal the legitimacy of 
secession under legal terms. Consequently, such analysis will shed light on the two following 
points: 1) It will reveal the degree to which theories and the law overlap, and 2) it will also show the 
disparities between international law and domestic law regarding secession. These two points will 
be elaborated on in the following chapter where there will be a discussion of the morality of 
international and domestic laws and whether they are in need of a revision. 
 First Scotland will be put under the framework of international law to evaluate on what 
ground they are able to be granted the right to secede. Then, the case of the Basque Country will be 
put under the same framework followed by a section that will review the favorable and unfavorable 
factors each case have for the right to secede.  
Scotland under the UN Declaration 
 The statements within the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples can be generalized to include the case of Scotland. As the title says, it is for 
colonial countries and peoples, and as the Ascriptive Group Theories section established, Scotland 
were confirmed to be a country of a “people” as per the terms of the theories. Under the declaration, 
there are seven statements a case must adhere to in order to have a legitimate justification for 
secession. The case of Scotland will be analyzed under five of the following statements as there in 
an overlap in arguments observed. 
1. The subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of 
fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to 
the promotion of world peace and co-operation.  
 Under the first term, the case must concern a people that are colonized, or at least under 
similar stresses. At its most recent unification that has established the status of Scotland, the 
Kingdom of Scotland voluntarily joined the Kingdom of England to form the Kingdom of Great 
Britain (Parliament, 2015). More recently, Scotland has enjoyed greater and greater autonomy in 
recent years, paired with the process of devolution that has been occurring in Scotland since the 
1990’s. With the passing of the Scotland Act in 1998, Scotland was granted their own parliament 
along with fiscal powers (Scotland Act, 1998). Additionally, given the chosen timeframe (after 
1945), Scotland has not suffered domination to warrant human rights violations by the central 
government in London. Thus, Scotland does not have a case for secession under the first term of the 
declaration. 
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
Like the opinion of Kosovo held by the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 2009) that does 
not prohibit declarations of independence, the people of Scotland have the right and freedom to self-
determination. Strictly applying the terms of international law, Scotland, as any other identified and 
distinct people, have legitimate grounds for a declaration of independence if it is the will of the 
people. This right does not consider domestic laws and their rules that may judge such a declaration 
otherwise. However for the purpose of this part of the analysis, a declaration of independence on the 
part of the Scottish people, or people that represent the majority, is legal by the terms set under this 
statement.  
 3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or education preparedness should never serve as a 
pretext for delaying independence.  
 While Scotland have enjoyed more than adequate institutions in the political, economic, 
social and educational spheres, many people may feel that such institutions, with their base in the 
London parliament, may not reflect their aspirations. However, Scotland enjoys many autonomic 
powers from the foundation of the Scottish Parliament, making Scotland mostly responsible for the 
level of adequacy present in these sectors (Scotland Act, 1998). A claim to secession based on the 
inability to control their sectors is thus not a reason in reality. Furthermore, Scottish citizens claim 
to be generally happy with the way the Scottish government are running these sectors (Scottish 
Public Opinion Monitor, 2012), furthering the argument to not grant the right to secede based on 
inadequacy of these sectors. Therefore, Scotland does not have a case for a declaration of 
independence under this statement. 
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent people shall 
cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete 
independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. 
 No armed, violent, or repressive measures against the Scottish people have taken place in 
recent history. By account of the chosen timeframe, Scotland have been a part of a democratic 
country with fair elections and with an increasing participatory power, especially in the last twenty 
years since the creation of the Scottish parliament and the recent Scottish referendum that granted 
them greater autonomy. By all accounts of recent history, Scotland has no argument for a legitimate 
declaration of independence under this statement.  
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity 
of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 Since Scotland announced the independence referendum, the British government has 
allowed the referendum to take place with necessary cooperation and little disruption to the process. 
Again, with reference to the process of devolution that has taken place especially since the late 
1990’s, Scotland has been a part of a country that has given Scotland the freedom to declare the 
degree of independence with the U.K., culminating in the Scottish Independence referendum in 
2014 (The Guardian, 2014). Under this statement, given Scotland’s fair inclusion and reign in 
political decisions, Scotland does not present grounds for a declaration of independence. 
 Statements five and seven have been omitted from the analysis for the following reasons: 
Statement number five is one of the least relevant for the cases of the Basque Country and Scotland. 
Although the declaration is aimed generally at colonized territories and peoples, statement five in 
particular makes direct reference to the Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories (of which 
Scotland and the Basque Country do not belong) that have been affected by colonization and are, or 
were, awaiting a change in status. The statement offers that such territories be granted their own 
state with no delay and no reservations from the colonizing state. It is an unconditional demand that 
offers little discussion to the debate of when nations, regions, or peoples may secede. Therefore, 
there will not be an analysis of this statement which adds no value to the thesis and will be left void.  
 Statement seven refers to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since the political, sovereign and individual basic human 
rights have all been covered in this section of the analysis, this statement will be omitted from the 
analysis so as to avoid repetition of the same argument. For an analysis relevant to this statement of 
the declaration, see statements 1 and 6.  
The Basque Country under the UN Declaration 
 As with Scotland, the case of the Basque Country will be put under the terms of the UN’s 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Like with 
Scotland, the Basque Country was observed to have an Ascriptive attribute to their case and as such 
will be included into the terms set by the declaration under the nominal characteristic of being a 
“peoples.” Like in the previous section, five of the seven statements will be used so as to avoid an 
overlap in arguments.  
1. The subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of 
fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to 
the promotion of world peace and co-operation.  
 Although there are claims of the Basque Country being a colonized region, the Basque 
Country can mainly be identified as a colonized region for the reason that ETA chose to counter 
Spanish oppression through violence, a third-world model of resistance (Jauregui, 1986). The 
Basque Country thus cannot be identified as a colonized territory in the same vein as the Trust and 
Non-Self-Governing-Territories, however may still be analyzed for the argument that they are under 
alien subjugation and domination, or at least, have been. Whether the Basque Country is a victim of 
alien subjugation can be made if historical events are considered, such as what some argue is the 
conquest and annexation of the Kingdom of Navarre in 1512 by the Spanish Kingdom of Fernando 
and Isabel (Pérez, 2010). Within the timeframe however, the Basque Country and Navarre were 
already a part of Spanish rule under Franco, so little argument can be made. In the process of the 
transition towards democracy after Franco’s death gave Basques the opportunity to choose a 
different status. The referendum however showed that Basques agreed to the terms set under the 
Spanish Constitution and the Statute of Gernika which pronounced the Autonomous Community of 
the Basque Country as a part of Spain (del Castillo Vera, 1980). Today, opinion polls still show that 
Basques are mostly content with the status quo and would not like a change in status neither 
towards greater centralization or complete independence (Euskobarómetro, 2014). Thus, the Basque 
Country are not afforded the right to secede under this statement for their inclusion and result in the 
latest elections, despite the history. 
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
 Like in the case of Scotland, the case of the Basque Country was considered to be a part of 
Ascriptive Group Theories where there is a common and distinct characteristic among the Basque 
population (e.g. Ch. 4.5). Under this classification, the Basque people are thus given the right, as a 
“people,” to self-determination. This right, as has also been mentioned in the opinion given to 
Kosovo, is usually considered in its context where various other factors, such as the role of the 
parent state, documents and agreements are considered. However, strictly following the meaning of 
the statement as closely as possible, while being conscious of disregarding the colonized aspect of 
it, the terms set under here give the Basque Country justification to declare independence on the 
grounds of the Basque Country being a “people,” as understood under Ascriptive Group Theory. 
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or education preparedness should never serve as a 
pretext for delaying independence. 
 As with Scotland again, the Basque Country are in a democratic, economically developed 
country in which an interpreted inadequacy of the educational, economic, political or social level 
are mainly experienced through differences of opinion of how these sectors should be handled 
rather than as a complete lack of capacity. The Autonomous Community of the Basque Country 
(ACBC), more so than in most other regions of Spain, enjoy many devolved powers and capabilities 
which allow them to take control of their financial and political sectors to a certain extent laid under 
the Estatuto de Gernika (Euskadi, 2015) and the process of devolution that has occurred since then 
(Bizkaia Talent, 2015). Under the Statute, the government of the Basque Country has control of 
social, educational and political decisions within the Basque Country. For example, in Basque 
speaking regions, including Navarre and the French Basque Country, school’s that teach primarily 
in Basque, ikastolak, are, besides being privately funded, also under the public system or private 
schools that are publicly funded (Ikastola, 2015). The point here is that many of the sectors under 
this statement are under the control of the Basque government and thus cannot be reasons to secede 
under reasons of inadequate management of such sectors under foreign control. Furthermore, like in 
Scotland, the Basque Country enjoy sufficient levels of these sectors in comparison to the rest of 
Spanish regions (e.g. Basque schools are rated among the best in Spain
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). Additionally, Basque 
citizens have expressed optimism at the capabilities of the Basque Government (Anuario, 2013). 
Therefore, for the reasons given above, the Basque Country does not have legitimate grounds for a 
declaration of independence under the terms that the sectors of the Basque Country are perceived to 
be, or are actually inadequate. 
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent people shall 
cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete 
independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. 
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It is under this statement where the differences between the two cases arise. In recent history 
at least, one big differentiating factor between the Scottish and Basque cases is the presence of 
violence. Scotland has been a part of a democratic monarchy at least for the given timeframe. Spain, 
on the other hand, has gone through a Civil War that resulted with the dictatorship of Franco. 
Franco’s victory meant that previous statuses that established a level of autonomy for the Southern 
Basque Country (ACBC and Navarre) were null and void, and were considered an equal part of 
Spain as the other regions (Cassel & Dehez, 2014). This meant many of their local laws (fueros), 
educational system, language and culture were not only not recognized, but were outright prohibited 
in public life (Landa, 2013). Many times this was accomplished by force of the Spanish national 
police, Guardia Civil, who beat and imprisoned people for speaking Basque (Cassel & Dehez, 
2014).  
The repression of Basque people and culture was met with armed struggle from the Basques 
in the form of the terrorist group ETA. In its violent history, up until recently, ETA has carried out 
more than 800 killings of policemen, politicians, and civilians, in the name of gaining independence 
for the Basque country (Euskonews, 2003; Hammer, 2007). The presence of ETA has presented a 
complicated situation in the pursuit for Basque independence. On the one hand, the violence has 
taken credibility away from the question of independence and possibilities of negotiations as the 
government will not talk to what it considers a terrorist organization (Cassel & Dehez, 2014). On 
the other, the central government has dealt with the issue with very questionable methods, methods 
that have raised the issue of human rights violations as a reason for independence (CETIM, 2013). 
When ETA were at its violent peak in the 1980’s, the central government became involved 
in what became known as the “dirty war” with the creation of the paramilitary group Grupos 
Antiterrorístas de Liberación (GAL) (Etxebeste, 2014). Combined with Franco’s era of Spain, the 
central government has been accused of being a part of 474 killings of Basque people as a direct 
result of Spanish repression on ‘Basqueness’ (Naiz, 2010). The use of violence continued between 
the two past the 1980’s when GAL ceased to operate. ETA continued to place bombs until the latest 
ceasefire in 2010, with further declarations of a definitive end to armed struggle and to even 
disband completely (Cassel & Dehez, 2014). The central government has continued its practice of 
arresting politicians, journalists, and civilians alike for accusations of having ties with ETA in 
which they are held incommunicado (not able to communicate with anyone) for up to five days 
where they are questioned and probed for answers, sometimes through torture (CETIM, 2013). The 
conflict between the reality of terrorism and the central government’s methods brings an interesting 
discussion of who is justified in committing violent acts and whether those acts are seen as 
necessary, for example so that terrorism may be extinguished, or if those same acts constitute as 
grounds for independence for the Basque Country (see Discussion where states have monopoly on 
establishing the rule of law). Though the final ruling would also consider other aspects of the 
situation, the actions of the Spanish government, by the Spanish National Police, its penitentiary 
system, and the so-called “dirty-war” supported by members of the Gonzalez administration 
(Etxebeste, 2014), give the Basque Country a case for secession under the terms of this statement. 
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity 
of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 The role of violence and terrorism, again, is a big aspect of analyzing the case of Basque 
independence. It is one reason why the situation is so complicated and why there are arguments for 
and against the secession of the Basque Country. In today’s political world, the presence of 
terrorism impedes the Basque Country to be granted independence as easily as other nations and 
countries as terrorists are treated as un-negotiable (Morodo, 2011), making the territorial integrity 
of the Basque Country debatable. However, the separation of the provinces exists for the simple fact 
that parts of the Basque Country belong to Spain and France, and attempts at establishing a 
referendum have been deemed unconstitutional and not allowed (Calvo, 2012). Therefore, under 
this statement, the Basque Country has grounds for legitimate secession under the grounds of 
Spanish disruption of the national unity of the Greater Basque Country and because political actions 
by Basque politicians are not given due process.  
5.4 International Court of Justice’s Opinion on Kosovo and the UN’s Resolution for 
Crimea 
Scotland 
 The previous sections have already discussed the situation of Scotland at length so as to 
avoid repetition, this section will merely judge Scotland under the following criteria based on the 
rulings of Kosovo and Crimea. This analysis will show the legitimacy of Scottish independence 
based on the most recent understanding of the law of secession as understood by international 
institutions (the U.N. and I.C.J.) and the international community in general.   
1) Absence of violence and violations of basic human rights  
 The lack of violence in the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the U.K. works in 
favor of both sides of the issue. Under the terms set solely under this statement, Scotland would not 
be denied the right to secede because Scotland, or any actors affiliated with Scotland, are not 
involved in violent actions unlike the case of Crimea (UN General Assembly, 2014). As was 
observed in both Kosovo and Crimea, the violent actions of one group or the other delegitimized 
their claims for or against secession (Ibid.; ICJ Reports, 2010). As Scotland is not in a violent 
situation, their claim to secession would not be rejected on these grounds. However in every 
situation there are multiple factors that lead to a decision of the legality of a conflict. These other 
related factors, such as the case for secession on remedial grounds, will be presented below.  
2) International political favorability (e.g. being in U.S.’s favor) 
 In line with the criteria above, and with reference to the view that international law reflects 
the interests of states, the principle of territorial integrity would most likely be supported in the 
situation where no other issues are apparent. Besides the view that territorial integrity would be 
favored by the international community because of the general interest of states to maintain their 
borders, no other factors of the situation between Scotland and the rest of the U.K. are apparent 
enough to acknowledge a decision favorable to one side or other. For example, Kabalan (2008) 
suggest that the U.S. voted in favor of Kosovo’s secession because it undermined the power of 
Russia and their interests, essentially going back to Cold War tactics. U.S.’s decision to state the 
territorial integrity of Crimea and undermine Russia fit the argument. For the situation in question, 
there are no apparent interests in a decision of going for or against secession other than for the 
maintenance of territorial integrity. Thus with the lack of violence or any other political interest, the 
principle of territorial integrity would be upheld over any other term in the international sphere, and 
Scotland would not be granted the right to secede.  
3) Ascriptive Group theory characteristics  
 As was established earlier in the analysis, Scotland have a rich culture of a distinct language, 
music, food, sport, and history that fit them into the prototype set forth in Ascriptive Group Theory. 
Furthermore, a poll of the identities of Scottish citizens revealed that more people feel “only 
Scottish” than “only English”, as well as feeling “more Scottish than English” (Whatscotlandthinks, 
2014; 2015). Under Primary Right Theories of secession, they would thus have a legitimate case of 
secession as they fulfill the requirement of belonging to a “people” (as understood by Ascriptive 
Group Theories) and is in line with the Nationalist Principle where a nation or group are afforded 
their own state (Buchanan, 1997). 
 However under the rulings and opinions of the international institutions, ascriptive 
characteristics of the Kosovar and Crimean cases were not grounds in and of themselves for a 
justification on the right to secede. Likewise, the international community would not accept a right 
to secede solely on the basis of an ascriptive characteristic of a case. The ruling and opinion of the 
ICJ and the UN based their on other factors having to do with Remedial Right Only Theories. 
4) Associative Group theory characteristics  
 Likewise for Associative Group theories, though they are referenced in the ruling and 
opinion, the fact of the plebiscite did not form the basis for the ruling in favor of secession. In 
addition, Scotland were granted the right to decide their status by way of referendum but voted 
against independence (The Guardian, 2014). In both situations, Scotland would not have a case of 
secession in any case. If Scotland had established a referendum and voted in favor of independence 
with a majority against the laws set in Constitution of the U.K. (see Catalonia in Discussion), their 
independence would not be recognized for the reason of upholding the laws (i.e. territorial integrity) 
of the parent-state as per the terms of international law observed in the case of Crimea. Scotland 
were in fact allowed to hold a referendum on independence but voted against it, and would not have 
a case for secession by the terms set under Primary Right theories either (Buchanan, 1997). 
5) Remedial resolutions based on violations of human rights (Remedial Right Only Theories) 
 Just as Scotland are not be prohibited the right to secede on the grounds of their non-
violence, Scotland are also not granted the right to secede based on remedial rights because the 
U.K. do not violate any basic human rights. Scotland therefore has no case for secession under 
theories of Remedial Right Only. With the lack of a violent conflict in mind, in the hypothetical 
situation in which Scotland attempted to establish a referendum and were not granted that right by 
the U.K., the principle of territorial integrity would be favored with respect to the laws within the 
U.K., as was observed on the ruling of Crimea (UN General Assembly, 2014). The lack of a conflict 
with reference to an aggressor favors the decisions of states. This can be attributed to three 
arguments seen in theory and international law: 1) The view that international law is a reflection of 
state interests (Discussion: States establishing international law), 2) To provide rights and 
opportunities more consistently through a stable platform (Buchanan, 1997; Horowitz, 2003), and 
3) To not set precedents where secession is too easy and promotes a chaotic world-order (Horowitz, 
2003). 
There are no reasons under the terms of international law and rulings for Scotland to be 
granted secession. Scotland does not fit into cases where the majority voted for independence 
(Associative Group Theory) or of being victims of violence and other relevant violations of human 
rights (Remedial Only Right Theory). Scotland do have a case for secession under Ascriptive Group 
Theory however reasons under Primary Right theories are not reason alone for secession. Therefore 
Scotland are not permitted the right to secede under international law.  
Still they were very close to achieving independence based on a referendum reached through 
mutual consent from the U.K. and Scotland. International law and institutions are not necessary 
where there is no conflict, however they do not promote the right to self-determination on grounds 
of democratic processes. A morally guided process towards secession gives the opportunity for 
region’s to determine their status and avoid an imminent conflict where the right to decide might 
not otherwise be given. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
The Basque Country 
 The characteristics and factors of the Basque Country have already been discussed and 
reviewed at length. The understanding of the factors in the Basque Country is well-established 
within the parameters of the theories and the international law of secession. To avoid repetition of 
the situation in the Basque Country, this section will look to review the Basque case of secession 
strictly under the framework of the ICJ’s opinion on Kosovo and the U.N.’s resolution for Crimea 
to assess the extent of the Basque case for secession under an up-to-date version of the international 
law of secession as this thesis understand it. 
1) Absence of violence and violations of basic human rights 
  In the situation in which the Basque case were presented in front of the international court, 
the recent history of political violence and presence of the terrorist group, ETA, the Basque Country 
would have difficulty in achieving the right to secede. Though violence has not been an issue since 
ETA’s ceasefire in 2011 (Cassel & Dehez, 2014), there are still many issues to be resolved and the 
history of violence will not judge a case for secession in their favor, especially considering the label 
of terrorism put upon proponents of independence in the Basque Country. Alleged members of ETA 
are still being arrested for their participation in the group (ElMundo, 2015) and many political 
prisoners are in jail for those reasons. Even though violence and killings are no longer present from 
the Basque side, the issues remain a problem and until they are resolved, the case for the Basque 
Country to become independent, or achieve a referendum, will not be regarded in front of the 
international court. 
2) International political favorability (e.g. being in U.S.’s favor)  
 In line with the statement above, the Basque Country would have difficulty in presenting a 
case of secession that is correlated with the use of arms and connected to ETA. A political 
aspiration (i.e. independence) that is tainted with terrorism will have little voice, especially under 
the current framework in which international institutions handle the issue of terrorism. For the 
better part of this century, states as well as international institutions have expressed their dissent for 
terrorist groups and their commitment to eradicate it under non-negotiable terms (Morodo, 2011; 
UNSC Resolution 1535, 2004). In addition, the principle of territorial integrity would be upheld in a 
case where the Basque Country establish a referendum on the right to secede as it has been done 
already in Spain in the case of Catalonia, and as was done in the case of Crimea where the 
referendum went against the Ukrainian constitution (UN General Assembly, 2014).  
3) Ascriptive Group theory characteristics 
 As was reviewed earlier, the Basque Country presented a case in which they fulfill the 
characteristics of Ascriptive Group Theory, which are a common culture and history. Opinion polls 
gathered by Euskobarómetro (2014) showed that Basques generally feel more Basque than Spanish 
in absolute terms (i.e. only Basque or only Spanish) and in degrees of both, where more people feel 
“more Basque than Spanish” than “more Spanish than Basque.” Under the Primary Right Theory of 
secession, the Basque Country would have a case for secession. However, as the opinion on Kosovo 
and the Resolution for Crimea showed, a decision for legitimate secession is not based only on the 
grounds of an expression of common language and culture. Under the grounds of Ascriptive Group 
Theory, the Basque Country would not have a case for secession in accordance with the recent 
judgment of legitimate secession of international institutions. Ascriptive characteristics however 
may be used to support the argument for secession depending on the context and other factors that 
influence the decision. 
4) Associative Group theory characteristics  
 Associative Group theories were shown to be a supportive rather than a decisive factor in 
the cases of Kosovo and Crimea. Where the decision was to grant the right to secede in Kosovo, the 
referendum was referenced to, to support the argument that the people of Kosovo want 
independence from Serbia (ICJ Reports, 2010), thus rendering it as not decisive. However, where 
the decision was to not grant the right to secede, the Crimean referendum was disregarded for the 
fact of it being unconstitutional and invalid (UN General Assembly, 2014; Economist, 2014). In the 
latest opinion polls gathered by Euskobarómetro (2014), results showed that most Basques, 36% 
favor the current status of autonomy. Slightly less than a quarter of Basques, 22%, would like 
independence for the Basque Country. Similarly, with regards to the statute of autonomy, 38% of 
Basques claimed they would vote to keep the statute of autonomy while 10% would not 
(Euskobarómetro, 2014). Regardless of the influence of Associative Group Theory characteristics, 
the Basque Country would not be able to use referendum results to support their case for the right to 
secede.  
5) Remedial resolutions based on violations of human rights (Remedial Right Only Theories) 
 Just as the Basque Country would not be granted the right to secede because of the 
connection of the independence struggle with violence and terrorism, they would also have a case 
for the right to secede under the grounds that Basque prisoners receive exceptionally unfair 
treatment from the Spanish state (CETIM, 2013). In both sides of the conflict there are cases of 
human rights violations (Landa, 2013). In the case for a Remedial Right to Basque secession, it 
starts with the dictatorship of Franco where Basques (and other nationalities within Spain) were 
unrecognized and punished for expressing their nationality (Cassel & Dehez, 2014), and continues 
today with the treatment of Basque prisoners (CETIM, 2013). There are currently 465 prisoners 
dispersed throughout Spain, some of which sentenced under the Parot Doctrine (CronicaGlobal, 
2015; CETIM, 2013), and many of which who have claimed be to tortured at the hands of the 
Spanish National Police (BBC, 2013). Naiz (2010) gathered that 474 Basques have died since 1960 
due to the repression from the Spanish state. In addition to these claims, members of Spanish 
Government of the 1980’s, PSOE, are accused, and in some cases convicted, of ordering the killing 
of Basque people and alleged ETA members through the mercenary group GAL, with connections 
from the Spanish National Police (Etxebeste, 2014).  
 Although there is aggression from the Spanish state and human rights violations are well-
documented in the case (CETIM, 2013; Etxebeste, 2014), context and the reasons for which they 
happen must be taken into consideration. Although such actions should never be tolerated, the fact 
of their occurrences exists because of the conflict between nation and state. Violence from one 
group is met with retaliation from the other, however to judge a resolution one way or the other is a 
difficult matter. In the case of Kosovo, Serbia’s aggression granted Kosovo the right to secede on 
the grounds that it served a remedy for the violence (ICJ Reports, 2010). The situation is different to 
the Basque case however since Kosovo’s retaliation was backed by NATO (Tanner & Stevenson, 
2010). Furthermore, the degree of violence against and dispersion of Kosovar’s reached much more 
extreme numbers than the current Basque case presents. As was argued earlier, the violations of 
human rights and aggression against Basque prisoners are a cause for concern but not for the right 
to secede under Remedial Only Right Theory. Taking the role of terrorism and past violence from 
ETA into consideration would also hinder the Basque Country’s case for secession in front of the 
international court.  
 
 
 
6. Concluding Discussion 
 
"Whether a region establishes itself on the international stage is fundamentally a political rather 
than a legal issue at root" (Phillips, 2010).  
This section will look to address the relevant questions that have surfaced throughout the 
thesis to conduct a discussion on them to propose answers to problems or further research in areas 
that are unclear. 
 The title of the thesis has not been referred to but there is a point to it. Ignoring the original 
meaning of the proverb – while maintaining some of it – the use of “The Broken Clock” suggests 
that the right time for independence occurs in a culmination of many factors (Meyer, 2004). It is 
also a nod towards the revision this thesis has aimed to propose – the idea that laws and theories are 
outdated, not able to keep up with changing practices: “The great cause of revolutions is this, that 
while nations move onward, constitutions stand still” (MacAulay, 1841). The analysis done here has 
revealed many factors that suggest when those times of secession may occur and consider secession 
to be valid under the terms of international law. The interesting point however, and the framework 
of the discussion, is that there is a discrepancy between the factors that show, a) when secession 
could occur (i.e. Scotland), b) when secession is valid under international law, and c) when a 
morally progressive mode of secession suggests it should happen (Tesón, 1998; Requejo, 2012). 
On factors that show when secession could occur 
The fact of a largely devolved government on the part of Scotland and a cooperative state on 
the part of the U.K. were the main factors in which secession could have occurred. In the 
hypothetical situation in which Scotland voted for separation and were granted independence, the 
factors they presented that would grant them the right to secede do not overlap with neither 
international law nor the theories of secession that correlate most with those laws under the terms of 
minimal realism – Remedial Only Right Theories (Buchanan, 1997). The case of Scotland did not 
present international intervention because the problem was dealt with domestically by an agreement 
from the U.K. and Scottish governments, bypassing the need for international institutions. The fact 
that Scotland were granted the right to decide is similar to the moral cosmopolitanism Requejo 
(2012) suggests in giving power to minorities in decision-making (i.e. the cratos), and the moral 
progression international relations should strive for. However the case of Scotland has shown that 
the process of Scotland’s hypothetical secession not to be in line with current laws and theories. To 
answer the first research question, “What do current international law and theories of secession say 
about the rights of Scotland and Basque country to secede?” the current laws and overlapping 
theories do not support such a method of secession that favor a rule of law closer to the standards of 
Remedial Only Right Theories. Furthermore, in response to the second research question, “What 
are the new characteristics of the law of secession in this context?” the characteristics of secession 
remain the same internationally, placing the responsibility to maintain the rule of law on states. A 
revision of this method will be argued for further below to answer part (a) of the second research 
question.  
The reality is that international institutions do not acknowledge such rights to minorities, or 
non-state actors. Since the 1960’s, international institutions have given the right to secede to 
nations, regions and countries that have gone through occupation or other violations of human 
rights, granting the right to secede only as a remedy. This method of granting rights and 
opportunities neglects political, cultural and societal rights to regions or nations who have not been 
victims of aggression. Because of the principle of territorial integrity, states determine the rule of 
law, sometimes neglecting minority nations’ access to the cratos (i.e. the decision-making powers) 
(Requejo, 2012). For international institutions to incorporate and enforce the right to secede under 
the same terms as of the Scottish referendum would promote the moral cosmopolitanism (Requejo, 
2012). Furthermore it supports a moral progression of politics that includes non-state actors and 
diminishes the influence of states in establishing rights (Tesón, 1998). Though in the case of 
Scotland there was no dispute, the situation is not always the same in plurinational states.  
This problem can be seen in the case of the Basque Country. The agreement of the 
referendum and granting of special rights – as Buchanan (1997) calls it – to the minority is not the 
case, and one of the problems among many, for the Basque Country. The process to resolving not 
only the secession issue, but also the violent history, does not have much Basque input in setting the 
terms of the rule of law. The current practice of international institutions, as understood here, does 
not facilitate the process of alleviating the situation in the Basque Country with the inclusion of 
minority opinions. Because there is no imminent threat of violence or war, international institutions 
cannot and do not intervene. Because of the principle of territorial integrity, states are given the 
privilege of handling domestic issues that is only taken away in the case of extreme basic human 
rights violations not seen in this context (Buchanan, 1997). The Basque Country is neglected of 
their political, social and cultural rights in this context for being under the power of the state 
(Requejo, 2012). The question then is, should international institutions intervene, or facilitate a 
process of resolution, in cases where there is no violation of basic human rights?  
Doing so would promote a process of resolution in which the rights of non-state actors are 
given greater weight. An institution that grants greater power to minorities within states suggests a 
revision of the laws within international institutions as suggested by Requejo (2012) and with 
inspiration from Tesón (1998) for a system of moral cosmopolitanism and a rule of law not 
established by states – and thus in the interest of states. A system in which laws are established by 
states fails to consider the rights of non-state actors (Tesón, 1998). For a morally defensible system 
of international law, laws would have to be established without the exclusive control of states. 
When laws grant the same rights and opportunities to non-state actors as to states, then it is 
suggestive of moral progression (Requejo, 2012). In the case of the Basque Country, intervention 
from, for example, the UN, would help establish negotiations between the central Spanish 
government and the Basque Country and put them on equal grounds. So far, a call for talks has been 
dismissed for claims that the proposal (i.e. referendum) was unconstitutional (Calvo, 2012) or 
because it concerns terrorists and they are not negotiable (Morodo, 2011), reflecting the idea that 
the rule of law is established by states (Tesón, 1998). 
To answer the problem formulation, “How do the recent referendum of Scotland and 
possibilities on the right to self-determination in the Basque Country challenge the current theories, 
and international and domestic laws of secession?” a process in which Scotland and the Basque 
Country’s secession is considered valid without the use of violence would pressure international 
and domestic institutions to reconsider the role of non-state-represented regions in the negotiations 
for secession. The referendum of Scotland challenges the view of international law on the validity 
of the secession while the possibilities of the Basque Country highlight the influence states have in 
instituting the rule of law that raise questions of the establishment of rights and the favorability 
placed on states.  
On how to expand rights beyond states 
For international institutions to establish laws outside of the exclusive influence of states, 
the principle of territorial integrity would have to be diminished. Otherwise, states are given an 
unfair position above other actors. For example, ETA is named a terrorist organization while 
violence from the Spanish police is justified through the use of the military (Fitzgerald, 2012) and 
presents a double standard when acknowledging victims of human rights violations (Landa, 2013). 
Likewise, states have control in deciding the terms of secession, such as claiming actions to be 
unconstitutional (Calvo, 2012). If the principle of territorial integrity is weakened and laws are 
established with non-state actors, international relations would serve a platform in which greater 
rights are available to more people under more peaceful means (Requejo, 2012).  
On the inclusion of the case of Catalonia  
The inclusion of a Catalonian case would serve purposeful to investigate the argument of the 
neglect of rights to minority groups. Since Catalonia are in the same situation as the Basque 
Country without the caveat of terrorism and the history violence, the issue does not stand in the way 
of a proposal for equal footing with the central government. Rights are catered towards the central 
government representing the state, whereas the rights of minorities are not reflected (Requejo, 
2012). The case of Catalonia here would serve to further the argument since they must address the 
same domestic laws but do not have the issue of terrorism to resolve like the Basque Country. 
Though Catalonia does not have such conflicts to resolve they are still presented with similar 
obstacles in which states have the advantage in setting the procedural terms of secession (Peral, 
2015). Inclusion of the case of Catalonia would thus serve to expand the argument that states have 
an unfair disposition in setting the rule of law in relation to non-state actors. 
On the moral revision of international law 
This section will aim to answer part (a) second research question, “What new characteristics 
promote a moral progress of the law of secession?” as well as the question postulated for this 
section alone, “Is the current understanding of international law morally defensible?” 
The argument that states influence the creation of international law has already been 
established (Reus-Smit, 2004). As Tesón (1998) argues, the creation of treaties among states is not 
sufficient to be considered a morally binding agreement for providing human rights because of the 
realist claims that states act in their own self-interest and will only sign treaties that fulfill those 
interests. Likewise, they will break them when they are not in their interests any longer. Thus, an 
international consensus between states is not enough to create normative force. For example, when 
a law is considered immoral, it is disregarded despite being an established practice (Ibid.). To 
establish a respect and progression of human rights, individual rights must be in consensus between 
the states of the world. This common set of values is the only defensible moral ground that can be 
adopted by countries around the world (Ibid.).  
How can international law promote such a world? First, the reliance on states to create law 
must be diminished. In an ever-increasing globalized world, non-governmental organizations and 
other non-state actors are becoming involved in international relations (Stephen & Zürn, 2014). To 
acknowledge this fact by international institutions would suggest an inclusion of laws that regard 
rights and opportunities for a greater amount of people, not only states. Requejo (2012) goes one 
step further and suggests a moral cosmopolitanism for international law to concern the rights of 
everyone individually. This perspective links a global justice system, moral cosmopolitanism with 
the right of minorities in plurinational democracies such as the one in Spain. A moral cosmopolitan 
refinement of international institutions will better accommodate national pluralism that has so far 
been represented by liberal constitutionalism and Western values (Requejo, 2012; Schwabach & 
Cockfield, 2002). 
The current theories of justice are limited to domestic justice (Requejo, 2012) which goes in 
line with the theory that international law reflects the laws of states (Reus-Smit, 2012). The reliance 
on states as providers and determiners of justice neglect the rights of the demo (or demoi – people) 
in a plurinational state, and their access to the cratos (Requejo, 2012). Though both Scotland and 
the Basque Country have their own governments and many devolved powers, their decision-making 
powers in international relations as well as in domestic disputes is limited to the power their parent-
state allow them. In an issue of secession where violence is not a threat, states have the advantage 
while neglecting the voice and influence of the minority nations. Where violence has been an issue, 
international institutions attend to minorities, such as in Kosovo and Crimea. However, where 
violence is not an issue, national minorities are left to the powers of the parent-state, presenting a 
short-coming in the availability of rights. Issues of national and cultural identities are not reflected, 
or supported by international institutions (Requejo, 2012). Thus, to answer the question at the 
beginning of this section, such a system does not promote a morally defensible method of justice 
and rights as it neglects those who are not in grave situations and not attended by international law. 
On the inclusion of moral cosmopolitanism in a process of secession 
When secession cannot be dealt with domestically, violent or non-violent, the international 
community should be brought. Intervention from the international community when there is no 
violent conflict undermines the principle of territorial integrity. To undermine territorial integrity 
would promote a moral cosmopolitanism as the principle only serves the interest of states. This 
would result in a fairer justice system for all actors, not only states (Tesón, 1998). The result would 
be that whenever a domestic issue presents itself and is dealt accordingly with fairness and justice, 
the need for war or violence should become obsolete. This would facilitate international institutions 
in avoiding violence, rather than reacting to it when it comes and fulfill the promise of the UN to 
keep peace and properity (Role of UN, 2010). This would also bypass discussions on to what extent 
must human right violations be necessary for a Remedial Only Right mode of secession. It would 
promote peaceful processes, greater justice in a global sense and suggest a revision of the current 
process of international relations that would instead be substituted by moral cosmopolitanism 
(Requejo, 2012).  
What position does the new context place future secession movements in? 
 In response to the third and final research question, the new context places no favorability 
on any actors to influence the rule of law. For example, the alleged influence of the U.S. in the 
ruling of Crimea would not be possible (Kabalan, 2008). In the new context, Crimea may already 
have secede from Ukraine and become one of Russia’s federations. In the ruling that Crimea’s 
referendum was invalid; steps would be taken to facilitate a new referendum that allows them to 
decide their status with greater cooperation with the Crimean government on equal grounds as 
Ukraine, the parent-state, or any state, such as the U.S. This means undermining the principle of 
territorial integrity with less importance put on constitutions, expanding the scope of rights beyond 
states and promoting a rule of law that bypasses the need for war for the creation of states (Requejo, 
2012). 
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